THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND SOCIAL ATTRIBUTIONS A MATTER OF OBLIGATION, CONTROL, OR CLARITY?

By

ANDREW N. CHRISTOPHER

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When Penn State football coach Joe Paterno was asked why his players did not wear their names on the backs of their uniforms, he replied that no single player could win or lose a game by himself. The only thing that mattered, Paterno argued, was how the team performed. While it is true only my name appears on the preceding page, I must concur with Coach Paterno that without a team of supportive people, this dissertation, like everything in which I have been involved during the past five years, would never have materialized.

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By

Andrew N. Christopher

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The purpose of my dissertation was to investigate one reason why the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) is associated with the tendency to attribute social ills (e.g., unemployment) to those who suffer from such ills. I hypothesized that endorsement of the PWE may be associated with the belief that people who suffer from social ills do so because they have failed to behave in a responsible manner. I operationalized "responsibility" using the Triangle Model of Responsibility, which states that a person's responsibility is a function of his or her obligation in the situation, control over the situation, and whether clear rules exist in the situation. In the first experiment, participants were given 21 questions to rank-order and rate for their valuableness in assessing another person's perception of a central character's responsibility in a situation. I expected the PWE to be positively associated with

obligation and control questions being ranked higher and rated as more valuable than clarity questions. However, this hypothesis was not supported.

In the second experiment, participants were given information about a central character's obligation, control, or clarity in a situation and asked to infer how much obligation, control and clarity that central character had in the situation. In addition participants made an estimation of how successful the central character would be in the situation, how engaged psychologically the central character was with the task, how much positive affect the central character should experience for a quality performance, and how much negative affect the central character should experience for a poor performance. Participants tended to infer more obligation and control information than clarity information. PWE was directly associated with inferences of obligation and control, but not clarity. PWE was also directly associated with estimates of success for the character, perceptions of the character's psychological engagement in the task, and the belief that the character should experience negative affect for a poor performance. Results are discussed with respect to how such inferences may play a role in the social attributions of those endorsing the PWE

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

He who neither worketh for himself nor for others,
will not receive the reward of God.

The Prophet Mohammed

Seest thou a man diligent in his business He shall stand before kings

Proverbs XXII, 29

Almost twenty years ago both Jahoda (1979) and Kelvin (1980) argued that the world is experiencing a decline in the work ethic, an attitude that endorses in the importance of hard work, the rewarding of those who succeed in their duties, and the punishing of those who fail in their duties As the worldwide level of structural unemployment rose Kelvin contended, societies would become lenient toward the unemployed and others who are "down on their luck " Such conditions would come to be perceived as somewhat typical and not deserving of scorn or punishment. Indeed, some writers concur that there has in fact been a decline in the work ethic (e.g., Nord, Brief Atieh, & Doherty, 1988) Such conclusions, however, tend to be based on societal trends Within any society, there will be significant variance in the extent to which individuals endorse the work ethic (or any other attitude). The purpose of the proposed research is to assess why it is that people who value the work ethic believe

that those who succeed in their duties should be rewarded and those who fail in their duties should be punished

The origins of the 'work ethic' to which Jahoda (1979) and Kelvin (1980) were referring can be traced to Max Weber's (1904-1905 1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The basic premise of Weber's writing is relatively simple--the Protestant Work Ethic provided moral and religious justification for the accumulation of wealth. He outlined how he believed that certain elements of Protestantism played a role in the rise of modern capitalism. In his two-part article, originally published in German and translated into English by Talcott Parsons, Weber proposed that the Protestant Reformation produced profound changes in the prevailing attitudes toward work during the 1500s Specifically, prior to the Reformation, work had been widely regarded as a burden, something that was a necessary means for livelihood. Weber contended that religious reformers such as Martin Luther extolled that all forms of work, no matter how seemingly menial, contained inherent dignity and worth To Weber, hard work was the surest sign that an individual was a true Christian In order for a capitalistic society to thrive, individuals in that system must subscribe to ascetic Protestantism (i e., being self-disciplined and honest, working hard, using time carefully, reinvesting one's gains rather than using them for hedonistic pleasures, and having faith in the rewards of a just God) His writing incorporated elements of many social sciences, including not only religion, but also psychology, and political science, and economics. By

encompassing many different disciplines. Weber's thesis had strong explanatory power

Given the strong religious overtones of Weber's (1958) thesis, and that he so powerfully tied these convictions to the development of capitalism, it may not be surprising that Weber's work has sparked many debates and criticisms about the specific role of the Protestant Work Ethic in the rise of capitalism. One supporter of Weber's thesis was Troeltsch (1931), who noted that work is a common calling in Calvinism, one form of Protestantism. As discussed in A.H. Green (1973), some economic historians (e.g., Hampden-Turner, 1981) also endorsed Weber's belief that Protestantism was one element in the rise of capitalism. However, such commentators claimed it was but only *one element* in the rise of this economic system, and they felt Weber neglected these other elements, such as prevailing political systems that were receptive to capitalistic ideas (it must be noted that even a cursory inspection of Weber's thesis reveals that he actually did discuss many of these other elements; he is criticized, however, for de-emphasizing their importance relative to that of Protestantism). Echoing this sentiment, some theologians (e.g., Robertson, 1933, cited in A.H. Green, 1973) questioned the religious origins of capitalism—perhaps it arose out of existing material conditions of a civilization. European civilization, with its relative abundance of material resources, was simply in a better economic position to experience the development of capitalism than were other civilizations, which may have been even more religious than Europe. With respect to the importance of Protestantism per se in the evolution of capitalism, Werner (1967, cited in A.H.

Green, 1973) argued that capitalism existed before the birth of Protestantism, and he cogently traced the development of capitalism to the economic practices of Judaism. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that other religions (e.g., Islam) and other Christian denominations (e.g., Catholicism) are fundamentally opposed to capitalism (cf. Hudson, 1961). Not to deny the importance of these exchanges (see R.W. Green, 1959; and Lehmann & Roth, 1993 for a provocative series of critiques of Weber's thesis), such an analysis is beyond the scope of the proposed research.

As can be gleaned from the above discussion, it is crucial to realize that an individual need not belong to a Protestant denomination to believe in the Protestant Work Ethic. As Furnham (1990b) and Mudrack (1997) both commented, the "Protestant Work Ethic" is now simply a term used to describe people who place work at or near the center their lives. It has minimal, if any, connection to being Protestant, Christian, or even religious at all. Perhaps the most straightforward characterization of an individual who adheres to the Protestant Work Ethic was provided by Ben-Hallahmi (1979):

> The Protestant (work) ethic is an orientation towards work which emphasizes dedication to hard work, deferment of immediate rewards, conservation of resources, the saving of surplus wealth, and the avoidance of idleness and waste in any form. (p. 263)

Clearly, such a description could apply to a staunch atheist as easily as it could to a devout Protestant. Perhaps Andrew Carnegie (1885-1965), a poor immigrant from Scotland who later founded the American steel industry, best captured the essence of the Protestant Work Ethic:

> Aim for the highest: never enter a bar room, do not touch liquor; or if at all only at meals: never speculate: never endorse beyond your surplus cash fund, make the firm's interests yours: break orders only to save owners: concentrate: put all your eggs in one basket and watch that basket, expenditure always within revenue, lastly, be not impatient, for as Emerson says 'no one can cheat you out of ultimate success but yourselves' (1965, p. 97)

People of all religions, not just Protestants, could easily follow Carnegie's advice.

In an extensive analysis of philosophical writings on the Protestant Work Ethic, David Cherrington (1980) delineated eight characteristics of people who endorse this systematic view of work. The broad meaning of the Protestant Work Ethic refers to one or more of the following actions:

1. People have a moral and religious obligation to fill their lives with heavy physical toil. For some, this means that hard work effort, and drudgery are to be valued for their own sake: physical pleasures and enjoyments are to be shunned, and an ascetic existence of methodical rigor is the only acceptable way to live.

2. Men and women are expected to spend long hours at work, with little or no time for personal recreation and leisure.

3. A worker should have a dependable attendance record, with low absenteeism and tardiness.

4. Workers should be highly productive and produce a large quantity of goods or service.

5. Workers should take pride in their work and do their jobs well.

6. Employees should have feelings of commitment and loyalty to their profession, their company, and their work group.

7. Workers should be achievement-oriented and constantly strive for promotions and advancement. High-status jobs with prestige and the respect of others are important indicators of a 'good' person.

> 8 People should acquire wealth through honest labor and retain it through thrift and wise investments Frugality is desirable, extravagance and waste should be avoided. (p. 20)

Recently psychological research has investigated how individuals who tend to endorse the Protestant Work Ethic differ in their social perceptions and attributions from those who tend not to endorse the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) McClelland (1961) conducted the earliest psychological research on the PWE He argued that parents PWE beliefs determine child-rearing practices on matters such as independence, delay of gratification, and desire for mastery over the environment. Parents who practice such child-rearing practices will develop children who have a strong achievement motivation, and it is this strong achievement motivation that leads a person to become successful in a capitalistic economy McClelland thus subsumed the PWE as a facet of achievement motivation But as Frey (1984a, b) demonstrated although achievement motivation and PWE are certainly related, they are far from overlapping constructs and may not be related in the manner that McClelland postulated Using cross-lagged correlational techniques, Frey found that at a societal level need for achievement is as much a consequence as a cause of economic prosperity Consequently, Furnham (1990b) argued that the need for achievement is one component of the PWE. In addition, Furnham (1984b) criticized McClelland's research for its often unscientific nature (e g., the use of psychoanalytic techniques to tap into a person's achievement motivation)

According to Furnham (1990a, b), the most commonly used measure of PWE beliefs is a 19-item scale constructed by Mirels and Garrett (1971) This scale which

can be viewed in Appendix A, has been employed in several studies investigating the impact that a person's extent of PWE endorsement has on their attributions for different social phenomena. These investigations have yielded a consistent result. That is, people who score high on the measure of the PWE tend to make stronger internal attributions for these phenomena than do people scoring low on this measure. I will now detail several such investigations.

In an examination of the causes of unemployment, Furnham (1982) identified three overriding causes. Individualistic attributions place the cause of unemployment on the unemployed themselves (e.g., laziness and lack of effort). This type of explanation is akin to an internal attribution. Societal attributions place the cause of unemployment on governmental or economic forces (e.g., the policies and strategies of the present government). Finally, fatalistic attributions place the cause of unemployment on chance, luck or fate (e.g., just bad luck). These latter two causes are akin to external attributions. Furnham found that high PWE scorers emphasized individualistic causes of unemployment more than did low PWE scorers. Given that high PWE scorers believed that the main cause of unemployment rested with the unemployed themselves, it is not surprising that Furnham also found that high PWE scorers also less supportive of welfare than low PWE scorers.

Because unemployment can have not only a negative financial impact, but also a negative psychological impact on the unemployed (e.g., Catalano, Novaco & McConnell, 1997; Kilpatrick & Trew, 1985; Wanberg & Marchese, 1994), psychologists have examined how people believe it should be alleviated. In a study of

suggestions to reduce unemployment, Patrick Heaven (1990) found that such suggestions were related to endorsement of the PWE. For instance, high PWE scorers supported tough-minded reform measures (e.g., We must reduce unemployment benefits) more than did low PWE scorers. In addition, high PWE scorers tended to be against increased government spending to stimulate the economy more than low PWE scorers. In summary, people who endorse the PWE tend to attribute unemployment to the unemployed themselves, and perhaps as a result, tend to be opposed to welfare and other external (governmental) interventions to solve this socio-economic dilemma.

One possible outcome for people who experience unemployment is that they will receive welfare money from their government. Furnham (1985a) examined the perceptions of 256 adults toward welfare recipients. People who strongly endorsed the PWE tended to perceive welfare recipients as lazy and more dishonest than people who less strongly endorsed the PWE. In addition, high PWE people more than low PWE people believed that it was not difficult to exist on welfare, and that welfare recipients suffered minimal stigma while receiving these public benefits. To one who strongly endorses the PWE, a person receiving welfare (i.e., who is not working for a living) is failing to engage in a behavior (work) that is an essential part of existence. Thus, it follows that people who strongly endorse the PWE would hold such negative attitudes toward welfare recipients.

If a person's unemployment is prolonged, welfare payments will eventually cease. This may leave people who experience prolonged unemployment in a state of

poverty Rather than examining how the PWE is related to attributions for unemployment, suggestions for reducing unemployment, or attitudes toward welfare recipients, MacDonald (1972) specifically assessed how the PWE is related to attitudes toward the poor and attributions for poverty A total of 101 American college students completed the Mirels and Garrett (1971) PWE scale and MacDonald's (1971b) 12-item Attitudes Toward Poverty Scale As hypothesized there was a significant correlation between PWE scores and negative attitudes toward the poor and attributions for poverty ($r = .41$) Thus, not only do high PWE individuals, when compared with low PWE individuals, tend to attribute unemployment more to internal causes and to recommend tough-minded reform measures they also are more negative toward those who live in poverty MacDonald (1972) attributed his finding to " the preoccupation with salvation (through work) of those who endorse the Protestant Work Ethic " (p 121) High PWE individuals may not perceive people in poverty as fulfilling this obligation (i e , work) to ensure their salvation.

In reviewing these studies and replications of them, Furnham (1990b) subsequently argued that the results of these and other investigations of the PWE and social perceptions were not simply a product of neutral information processing but were linked to peoples' cognitive affective systems As he stated, PWE values influence the way people explain a widely different range of events..including the causes af unemployment. Thus the PWE can be seen as an organizing cognitive system through which the social world is perceived and 'explained'" (p 182)

In an effort to better-understand how the PWE is linked to peoples' cognitive-affective systems, Furnham (1987) examined the relationship between the PWE and a variety of terminal and instrumental values (cf. Rokeach, 1973). Rokeach conceptualized a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct (instrumental value) or end-state of existence (terminal value) is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 5). It is the relationship between PWE and instrumental values that is of particular interest to the proposed research. Two hundred fifty six participants completed the Mirels and Garrett (1971) PWE Scale and ranked Rokeach's 18 instrumental values (e.g., capable, logical, loving; the complete list appears in Furnham, 1987, p. 631, and in Rokeach, 1973, p. 28) from most important to least important. These value rankings were subsequently transformed to z scores corresponding to 18 equal areas under the normal distribution curve. Using a step-wise multiple regression, Furnham found that the value of responsibility was significantly predictive of PWE scores. That is, people who tend to value responsibility tend to have high PWE scores. Feather (1984) found similar results in a study of the PWE, conservatism, and values. In addition, MacDonald (1971a) found a positive association between PWE and the ethics of social responsibility ($r = .37$). Thus, these studies suggest that one reason why high PWE individuals make stronger internal attributions for social phenomena is that they, relative to low PWE individuals, value responsibility. To high PWE individuals, perhaps those who are unemployed, on welfare, or living in poverty have reached such end-states because they lack a sense of responsibility. Such a violation

of a cherished value may contribute to the general finding that high PWE individuals relative to low PWE individuals make stronger internal attributions for social these social phenomena (cf Biernat Vescio, & Theno, 1996)

If indeed responsibility is a cherished value of high PWE individuals it is necessary to understand precisely what is meant by the term "responsibility" in Furnham s (1987) and Rokeach's (1973) research, responsibility is used in a unidimensional sense However, an inspection of the philosophical and psychological literatures reveals that this term has been used in no less than six different capacities (Schlenker, 1997, Schlenker Britt Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994) The first usage of the term responsibility is to refer to causation of some event Kelley's (1967) covariation model of attributions is an example of responsibility in the sense of causation Kelley proposed that observers will infer that an individual caused some event to the extent that the person s behavior is distinctive (the person behaves the same way to other situations), consistent (the person behaves the same way in this particular situation over time) and that there is consensus in behavior (few other people behave the same way in this particular situation) Specifically, when distinctiveness is low, consistency is high, and consensus is low, observers will attribute the cause of the behavior to something internal to the individual who performed it

A second way in which the term responsibility has been used is to refer to the mental capacity to behave in a certain manner (Hart, 1968) Children, as compared with adults are often relieved of responsibility for their actions because they are

assumed not to possess the ability (i e., mental capacity) to foresee the consequences of their behaviors Thus, when a young child commits a murder, s/he is rarely held responsible for his or her action (as evidenced by not being sent to jail for life or sentenced to death, two sanctions that are typical for an adult murderer), because it is assumed that child lacked the mental capacity to understand the ramifications of the behavior

Responsibility has also been used to refer to a person's mental state in which an individual exercises free will to bring about some outcome In his seminal book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relationships, Fritz Heider (1958) proposed five levels for judging a persoo's responsibility- his theorizing reflects this notion of responsibility as a mental state The first level of responsibility is the association principle People are responsible by association If they are in any way connected to some outcome People may hold a weatherpersoo responsible by association for a torrential rainfall because s/he discussed the possible weather-related event in the previous evening s forecast Heider's second level is that of commission, at this level, people are held responsible for the outcomes of their actions, aven if they could not have foreseen the consequences of these actions For instance, a child may spill his milk at the dinner while reaching for something on the table, although the child did not intend to spill the milk, his parents may still hold him responsible for this action (perhaps by chastising him or withholding dessert) The third level of responsibility is that of foreseeability, at this level, people are held responsible only if in fact they could have reasonably realized the consequences of their actions prior to engaging in

them A person may be held responsible for another individual's death if s/he lost control of a car while driving at 120 miles per hour Although it was not in the person's plans to kill another most people would still hold the driver responsible because the consequence of such a driving speed is one that most people can reasonably foresee The fourth level of responsibility is that of intentionality; at this level, people are held responsible to the extent they intended to bring about certain consequences Finally, the fifth level of responsibility of that of extenuating circumstances; at this level, responsibility is shifted downward to the extent that other factors may have surrounded a person's behaviors Returning to the previous example, if the driver traveling at 120 miles per hour was doing so because s/he was being chased by a crazed ex-lover, then should his or her driving result in the death of another person, less responsibility might be attributed to the fast driver because of this factor These five levels of responsibility are generally regarded as gradual increases in sophistication of responsibility attributions (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980 Schlenker et al., 1994 Shaw & Sulzer 1964)

A fourth way in which responsibility has been conceptualized is as a personal obligation arising out of moral or legal codes of conduct (e.g , Hart, 1968) For instance, suppose there are two students in a class, and one has been absent for several weeks Upon returning, the often-absent student asks the other if he can borrow her notes because he has been in the hospital during the past several weeks In a situation in which a person has had an unfortunate consequence befall him, many people will feel a sense of moral obligation to help that person (cf Berkowitz, 1972) If

however, the student missed several weeks of class because of taking a prolonged vacation, then it is likely that the other student would not feel a sense of moral obligation to help that person.

Hamilton (1978, 1986) conceived of responsibility in a different way. She specified that responsibility judgments depend not simply on what a person should have done in a situation, but also what a person should have done in a situation given his or her social roles. Parents may be held responsible for the behaviors of their children, supposedly, a child's behavior will reflect how the parent fulfilled his or her social role of "parent," a role that entails teaching the child appropriate behaviors. If the child behaves admirably, the parent will be credited/praised for a job well-done, if the child misbehaves, the parent will often blamed for the child's conduct.

Lastly, responsibility has also meant being answerable for one's actions (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). This meaning of responsibility focuses on making judgments of others for the purpose of rewarding those who perform admirably and punishing those who fail to perform to some acceptable level. For instance, a student in a class is responsible in this sense because s/he needs to perform at a certain level (i.e., demonstrate a certain level of mastery of course content) to earn a particular grade. Thus, the student is responsible to the teacher for demonstrating course content mastery.

Thus, there are certainly many meanings of the term "responsibility." The difficulty of operationalizing the concept of responsibility is perhaps evidenced in Rokeach's (1967, cited in Rokeach, 1973) own validation of his 18 terminal and 18

instrumental values Of these 36 values, all but one demonstrated a test-retest reliability of greater than 0 50, that one value was responsibility Although Rokeach offered no explanation for this finding, perhaps the rather vague nature of the concept of "responsibility" contributed to this low level of reliability The same participants may have interpreted the value of responsibility differently on the different testing occasions Both Rokeach and Feather (1987) simply used the term as a unidimensional concept. However, from the preceding discussion, it may be reasonably concluded that "responsibility" is by no means a unidimensional concept. From their research, it is unclear which of the above meanings their participants were inferring

Given the potential conceptual confusion surrounding the concept of responsibility, Schlenker (1986 Schlenker, Weigold & Doherty, 1991, Schlenker et al , 1994) provided a framework that integrated these various notions of responsibility The Triangle Model of Responsibility can be used to assess the processes and information people use when making attributions of responsibility for their own and other peoples' behavior and behavioral outcomes. This model conceptualizes responsibility as "the adhesive that connects an actor with an event" (Schlenker et al., 1994, p 640) Specifically, this model posits that there are combinations of three pieces of information observers use when making attributions of responsibility for a person's behavior and behavioral outcomes

The first piece of information used to determine an individual's level of responsibility is the prescriptions for behavior on a given occasion These are the

rules by which an individual should abide. For example, one common prescription in our society is that it is wrong to kill another human being, and the individual who breaks such a prescription is usually subject to societal sanctioning.

The second piece of information used to determine an individual's level of responsibility is the event to which the prescriptions apply. To continue the previous example, the event is killing another human being.

The final piece of information used to determine an individual's level of responsibility is the person's identity as it applies to the prescriptions and the event. Although in our society it is a prescription not to kill another human being, a person's identity may well entitle that person to kill another human being (e.g., a prison electrocutioner, by virtue of this identity, is indeed exempt for the general prescription not to kill, and in fact, must at times follow a prescription to kill another human being).

As this simple example illustrates, each piece of information in isolation is not always informative about a person's level of perceived responsibility in a given situation. Consequently, these three basic pieces of information must be combined to gain a clearer sense of an individual's level of perceived responsibility in a given situation. Each of the three possible combinations of the three basic pieces of information shall now be discussed.

According to the Triangle Model of Responsibility, each combination of the three basic pieces of information can be conceptualized as a linkage. There are thus three linkages that combine to form what appears to be a triangle, hence the name of

the model. The first such link is the prescription-identity link. This is a measure of the extent to which rules of conduct apply to a person because of that person's actual or perceived characteristics, roles, and/or beliefs. It reflects Hamilton's (1978, 1986) notion of responsibility as an obligation that arises out of that person's social roles. Certain prescriptions apply to some people because of an identity to which they have committed themselves. These same prescriptions do not apply to other people because they are not relevant to an identity that they have claimed. This link should be perceived as strong (and hence greater responsibility will be attributed to an individual) the more that it appears that certain rules unquestionably apply to that individual based on an identity that that person has claimed. It is generally assumed that a college student, for example, should perform well on exams (the prescription) because part of being a college student (the identity) involves demonstrating one's knowledge on exams. Conversely, this link should be perceived as weak (and hence less responsibility will be attributed to an individual) the more that the rules, given an individual's identity, do not apply to that person, or are conflicting and difficult to prioritize. This same prescription of studying for an exam would not apply to a professional athlete, whose identity does not demand that s/he follow this particular prescription. In addition, although a college student is expected to study for exams, it may be the case that another identity interferes with his or her identity as a college student. When a student is unable to take an exam because of the claim that a grandparent has suddenly died, the student is claiming that his or her identity as a dutiful grandchild must take priority over his or her identity as a college student. In

such a situation, the student is hoping the teacher will allow his or her identity as a grandchild to take precedent over the identity as a college student and delay the exam until after family affairs are rectified.

The second of these links is the identity-event link. This is a measure of the extent to which a person is perceived to have control over an event. It reflects Weiner's (1986, 1993) notion that if a person is perceived to have control over some outcome, then observers will judge him or her to be responsible for that outcome. Such perceived control will be greater when observers believe that a person intended to bring about foreseeable outcomes and did so when external pressures are minimized. For example, if a student has an entire semester to complete a 25-page research paper, it is likely that s/he will be perceived as having a great deal of control over completing that assignment (and hence the link will be strong). Consequently, under this circumstance, observers will attribute greater responsibility to the student. If, however, the student has only a week to complete that same assignment, it is likely that s/he will be perceived as having minimal control over completing that assignment (and hence the link will be weak). Consequently, under this circumstance, observers will attribute less responsibility to the student.

The third and final link is the prescription-event link. This is a measure of the extent to which clear rules and procedures exist for a person to follow in a given situation (i.e., for a given event). It reflects Latham and Locke's (1991) assertion that having clear goals for which to aim leads to better performance. If a person is perceived to have clear goals (i.e., rules and procedures) for which to aim in a

situation, then an evaluative audience will hold that person responsible because s/he should be able to perform well in that situation. This link will be strong (and hence more responsibility attributed to an individual) to the extent that observers perceive that clear rules exist for a person to follow in a given situation. This link will be weak (and hence less responsibility attributed to an individual) to the extent that observers perceive that there is a lack of clear rules for a person to follow in a given situation. For instance, a supervisor may tell a salesperson that s/he needs to reach a certain level of sales to earn a bonus. If the supervisor provides clear rules and guidelines for how salespeople can go about reaching their sales goals then, the prescription-event link will be strong, and observers will be likely to judge the salesperson to be responsible for his or her sales performance. If the supervisor does not provide clear rules and guidelines for how salespeople can go about reaching their sales goals, then the prescription-event link will be weak, and observers will be likely to judge the salesperson to be less responsible for his or her sales performance than when the link is strong.

According to this model, an evaluative audience will judge a person's level of responsibility in a given situation to be a direct function of the *perceived* strength of each of these three links. The stronger each of the links appear to be, the more observers will assume an individual is responsible in a given situation. If all three links appear strong, perceptions of responsibility will be at their greatest. If all three links appear weak, perceptions of responsibility will be at their least.

In their initial validation of this model, Schlenker et al (1994) performed two studies The first experiment assessed the extent to which people make judgments of responsibility, motivation, commitment, praiseworthiness (blameworthiness), and expectations for future performance for another person's behavior based on the strength of each of the three linkages The second study examined the extent to which people seek out information about each of the three linkages, compared with other information, when having to evaluate another person.

In the first study participants were presented with vignettes in which a central character was depicted in a situation in which the strength of each of the three links was either strong or weak. Based on these manipulations, participants made evaluations of the central character on 12 dimensions, which were summarized into two factors--responsibility and determination. It was found that the central character was judged to be more responsible and determined when one as opposed to none of the links was strong, more responsible and determined when two as opposed to one of the links was strong, and even more responsible and determined when all three of the links were strong Thus, judgments of responsibility were indeed a direct function of the combined strength of the three links

Schlenker et al.'s (1994) second study dealt with what types of information observers desire when making judgments of responsibility about another person. The 81 participants were told that they would need to assess how responsible a particular business employee was for his company s failure to reach its sales goals Participants could select from a menu of 34 questions those that they wanted answered in making

their assessment. Of these 34 questions, some dealt with each of the three links of the Triangle Model. For example, a question tapping the prescription-identity link was "Does Matthew (the employee) possess the abilities and experience required by his job, or did the company misassign him to a job?" A question tapping the identity-event link was "Did internal company conditions exist that would have affected sales irrespective of what people in sales did (e.g., breakdowns of equipment, employee strikes)?" A question tapping the prescription-event link was "Were the steps or procedures that could be used to reach the sales goals clear and well-defined?" Other types of questions dealt with the consequences of the failure to reach the sales goal. An example of such a question was "How detrimental to the company was the failure to reach sales goals: that is, how much money was involved?" Finally, some questions were irrelevant to both the links and the consequences. An example of such a question was "Is the company national or international in scope?" After selecting as many of the questions as they desired to have answered, participants then rated all 34 questions on how valuable they were in making their responsibility assessment. Finally, participants selected the 10 questions they thought were most important in judging the character's responsibility for the failure. Participants selected questions pertaining to the links more often than questions pertaining to the consequences or irrelevant questions. Comparisons of the three links revealed that participants preferred to have information about the two identity relevant links (the prescription-identity and identity-event links) than about the prescription-event link. Furthermore, questions pertaining to the links were perceived to be more valuable than questions about

consequences, which in turn were perceived to be more valuable than irrelevant questions Finally when asked to select the 10 most valuable questions, participants almost exclusively picked questions pertaining to the links Comparisons of the three links revealed that participants selected as most valuable those questions pertaining to the two identity links as opposed to the prescription-event link.

In addition to clarifying the conceptual confusion surrounding the concept of responsibility Schlenker et al 's (1994) Triangle Model of Responsibility provides another benefit to attributional researchers, as implicitly discussed above, this model allows researchers to quantify the amount of responsibility a person is perceived to have in a given situation. Of course, as Schlenker and his colleagues did, one can learn how much responsibility a person is perceived to possess by varying information about the strengths of the links in a particular situation Such manipulations allow researchers to specify what information is important in making judgments of responsibility

As discussed previously, responsibility appears to be so important value for high PWE individuals (Feather, 1984, Furnham, 1987, MacDonald, 1971a) It is perhaps this value that leads them to make more internal attributions for social phenomena such as unemployment, welfare, and poverty Such end states could potentially be perceived as results of not fulfilling one's responsibility to work hard Using Schlenker et al 's (1994) conceptualization of responsibility, it is now possible to investigate this possibility as well as which aspect(s) of responsibility (obligation,

control, or goal clarity) is (are) particularly important to high PWE individuals. This is the goal of the proposed research.

To gain some insight into which aspect(s) of responsibility is (are) particularly important to high PWE individuals, it is now necessary to review research that has examined the work-related behavior and attitudes of high and low PWE individuals. In addition to research examining the social perceptions and attributions of individuals who endorse the PWE, a related stream of research has examined the work behavior of those who endorse the PWE. In two experiments, Greenberg (1977) examined how people's endorsement of the PWE related to their reaction to receiving negative feedback during a laboratory task. In the first experiment, Greenberg found that when high PWEs received negative feedback about their performance, they showed a subsequent task performance improvement. Conversely, when low PWEs received negative feedback about their performance subsequently deteriorated. According to Greenberg, the negative feedback may have signaled to high PWEs that they were failing to work hard, and their subsequent task performance improvement may have been the result of trying to compensate for this inadequacy.

In Greenberg's (1977) second experiment, high and low PWEs were placed in a dyadic work group to perform a clerical task. All participants were informed that their performance on the task was inferior to that of their partners, however, half of the participants were told their partner's performance would be sufficient for both of them to receive a reward (success expectation), whereas the other half of the participants were told their partner's performance would not be sufficient to receive a

reward (failure expectation) It was found that high PWEs continued to work on the clerical task equally hard and well after the success/failure expectation manipulation was implemented Low PWEs, however, were greatly affected by this manipulation such that when led to expect success, their performance quality dropped Furthermore, high PWEs did not differ in their liking of the task regardless of success/failure expectations As Greenberg commented "They (high PWEs) apparently felt compelled to perform at an equally high level whether were trying to achieve a reward they didn't expect to attain, or were trying to earn an impending reward they expected to be won for them by their partner" (p 688) In addition, low PWEs liked the task much more when expecting success than when expecting failure In fact, low PWEs liked the task more than high PWEs when expecting success. Taken together, the results of these two studies seem to suggest that high PWEs experience a sense of obligation to work hard, and such feelings are independent of expectations for success. Among low PWEs, such feelings of obligation exist only when they perform well on a task, or expect to receive some reward from doing the task irrespective of their own performance

In another study of how the PWE moderates reward allocation Greenberg (1978a) manipulated 128 participants outcomes (won or lost) on a clerical task, as well as the fairness of those outcomes (fair or unfair) When the outcome of the task was fair, high PWEs tended to distribute the available reward (100 raffle tickets) according to an equity norm, keeping more than half when they won and less than half when they lost However, when the outcome of the task was unfair due to an

experimenter error, high PWEs attempted to reestablish fairness by compensating the other person who was wronged by the experimenter (i.e., by giving the other person more raffle tickets than when the outcome of the task was fair). Low PWEs tended to keep half of the raffle tickets, regardless of the outcome or the fairness of that outcome. Greenberg noted that differences in PWE endorsement seems to be related to using different inputs in making distributive judgments and that one such input is effort expended on a task. If an outcome is unfair, then high PWEs seem to believe that the individual hurt by the unfairness should not be penalized (i.e., they should be compensated) if s/he has been putting forth effort at the task. If this interpretation is true, then high PWEs seem to be emphasizing an obligation to work hard, and if that obligation is satisfied, then a person should not be penalized even if the outcome of the hard work does not turn out positively.

Greenberg (1978b), in yet another study of the PWE, cleverly examined the work habits of high and low PWEs on their train commutes to and from their places of employment. Among a sample of 273 adults, Greenberg found that PWE scores were positively correlated with the relative frequency of working while commuting ($r = .46$), the perception of commuting as an extension of work time rather than leisure time ($r = .29$), and a preference for working relative to commuting ($r = .39$). Greenberg stated that these findings reflect the "abstract duty to work and the great abhorrence for wasting time central to Protestant ethic ideology" (p. 757). Greenberg thus seemed to interpret his findings as evidence for high PWEs to view work as a personal obligation.

That high PWEs perceive their commutes as extensions of work-time, the results of Kidron's (1978) research are perhaps not surprising. Kidron found a positive relationship between the extent to which an individual endorses the PWE and their moral commitment to the organization for which s/he works. By moral commitment, Kidron was referring to "the individual's incorporation of organizational values and goals into his own identity" (p. 241). In explaining this finding, Kidron pointed to work by Werkmeister (1967) on the relationship between value orientations and personal obligations. Werkmeister contended that "...the obligations arising out of commitments are ...obligations to live by certain principles and rules--by principles and rules that is, which, being constitutive of the community to which we are committed, may themselves by regarded as moral principles and moral rules" (pp. 160-161). Thus, when one values work, it would follow, given Werkmeister's logic, that the person would feel an obligation to work. Kidron's relationship between PWE and moral commitment makes sense, given that the PWE is a measure of the extent to which an individual values work.

In addition to research examining work-related attitudes and beliefs, research has also examined the relationship between a person's endorsement of the PWE and his or her employment status. Feather (1982) hypothesized that he would find less evidence of PWE endorsement among the unemployed than among the employed. He reasoned that among employed people, it would be more important to value work than it would be for unemployed people. In a sample of 78 employed and 69 unemployed participants, Feather found significantly lower PWE scores among unemployed males

than among employed males As Feather noted, it is not possible to state why the unemployed males had lower PWE scores than the employed males For instance, does one's endorsement of the PWE decline as one's length of unemployment increases? Does one's lack of PWE endorsement make that person more susceptible to becoming unemployed? Feather s data do not provide unequivocal answers to these questions (and subsequent research has not addressed them) However, this study does indicate some relationship between endorsement of the PWE and one's work status When one does not value work (i.e , does not endorse the PWE) as much as other people that person is more likely to be unemployed Such an employment status would be far less acceptable to one who feels an obligation to work (i.e , one who endorses the PWE)

That high PWEs seem to experience an obligation to work does not appear to be limited to employment-related concerns and situations Merrens and Garrett (1975) examined the work behavior of high and low PWEs on a repetitive task (drawing 'Xs in the middle of circles with one's non-dominant hand) Participants were told to mark as many circles as possible until they got tired The dependent variables were the amount of time the participant spent in the room and the number of circles marked with an 'X ' High PWEs spent an average of 23 minutes in the room, while low PWEs spent an average of 16 85 minutes in the room. Furthermore, high PWEs marked almost twice as many circles ($\underline{M}$ = 1025) compared with low PWEs ($\underline{M}$ = 637 5) Given the nature of this task, it is unlikely that such results could be due to a pre-existing difference in ability levels between high and low PWEs. Thus, even on

monotonous and seemingly meaningless tasks (in that no reward was expected), high PWEs seem to feel an obligation to carry-out such duties more so than low PWEs.

From this line of research, it could be concluded that high PWE individuals tend to believe that they can and should attempt to do their best work, even in the face of obstacles and deterrents. To a high PWE individual, performing to the best of one's abilities is simply an axiom by which one abides. It thus appears that high PWE people might perceive work as a calling, or more precisely, an obligation to be fulfilled.

Other research, however, indicates that it is perhaps the case that high PWE individuals value responsibility because they tend to believe that outcomes are under their control relative to low PWE individuals. In their initial validation of their PWE scale, Mirels and Garrett (1971) found a significant relationship ($r = -0.30$) between the scale and Rotter's (1966) internal-external locus of control scale (because Rotter's scale is scored in the direction of external locus of control, this correlation is negative). Other research has replicated this finding (e.g., Lied & Pritchard, 1976, $r = -0.23$; MacDonald, 1972, $r = -0.35$; Waters, Bathis, & Waters, 1975, $r = -0.41$). Thus, it could plausibly be argued that high PWE's sense of control underlies the importance they attach to a sense of responsibility. Thus, the research discussed does not seem to clarify unequivocally whether high PWE's feelings of obligation to work, or feelings of control over work, underlies the importance they attach to a sense of responsibility.

As mentioned previously the overriding goal of the current research is to learn what type of responsibility information underlies high PWE individual s tendency to make internal attributions for social phenomena such as unemployment, welfare, and poverty Some research suggests that perhaps high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals believe that others have an obligation to perform well on tasks, in Schlenker et al 's (1994) terminology, high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals tend to perceive a strong prescription-identity link when judging others people's behavior and outcomes Other research, however, suggests that it might be the case that high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals believe that others have control over tasks and should thus perform well on tasks, in Schlenker et al s terminology, high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals tend to perceive a strong identity-event link when judging others people's behavior and outcomes. Finally although I know of no research that supports this possibility perhaps high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals tend to believe that others have clear rules and procedure to follow in Schlenker et al.'s terminology high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals tend to perceive a strong prescription-event link when judging other people's behavior and outcomes In this latter case, it is perhaps possible that high PWE individuals more than low PWE individuals perceive the world as a predictable place and assume that most tasks in life are clearly defined. Without theory to substantiate this latter possibility it is important to note that this is only my personal speculation Two studies attempted to

clarify which element(s) of responsibility seems to be at the core of high PWE individuals' social attributions.

STUDY 1

The first study examined what types of information both high and low PWEs prefer to ask of another person in assessing that other person's perception of a third party's responsibility. This investigation was similar to the second study in Schlenker et al.'s (1994) research on the Triangle Model of Responsibility, with one important modification. In Schlenker et al 's second study, participants read a scenario in which a company failed to accomplish some goal (that is, to reach a certain level of sales). Indeed, it seems that most of the existent research examining how the PWE is related to social attributions has focused on negative/failure type situations (e.g., unemployment, welfare, poverty). To my knowledge, no such research has examined how the PWE is related to social attributions focusing on more positive/success situations. This distinction between negative situations (typically the focus of PWE and social attributions research) and positive situations can be likened to Higgins (1997) distinction between a prevention focus and a promotion focus. According to Higgins, a person with a prevention focus tends to be sensitive to the absence or presence of negative outcomes (such as unemployment, welfare, and poverty), whereas a person with a promotion focus tends to be sensitive to the absence or presence of positive outcomes (such as a job promotion, having wealth, or winning a competition). Apparently, research on the PWE has implicitly assumed this

personality variable to be one with a prevention focus. Is this in fact a valid assumption? In this first study, participants were randomly assigned to a situation in which a person is either trying to avoid a failure (i.e., prevention focus) or achieve a success (i.e., promotion focus). It was hoped that this modification of Schlenker et al.'s second study would help answer this question.

Hypotheses

From the preceding discussion of the work habits and attitudes of high PWE individuals, it could be argued that they perceive work as an obligation to be fulfilled, and this may lie at the heart of their social attributions. Likewise, it could be argued that high PWEs feel that they, as well as others, have control over their social environments, and thus can bring about desired end-states. People who fail to bring about such desired end-states are thus evaluated more negatively by high PWEs. Consequently, it may be either of these two types of responsibility information that they will deem important to ask another person when evaluating a third party. Thus, the following two specific hypotheses are offered:

H1. When asked to rank order questions tapping into obligation, control, and goal clarity information, high PWE individuals will rank obligation and control information as more important than will low PWE individuals. No differences are expected between high and low PWE individuals in their rank ordering of goal clarity information. Thus, I anticipate a PWE by type-of-information ranked interaction in the participants' preferences.

H2. When rating obligation, control, and goal clarity information for their respectively utility in assessing a neutral character's responsibility, high PWE individuals will rate obligation and control information to be more useful in making such an assessment than will low PWE individuals. No differences are

expected between high and low PWE individuals in their usefulness ratings of goal clarity information. Thus, I anticipate a PWE by type-of-information interaction in the rating of information usefulness.

In addition to testing these hypotheses, this first study provided an opportunity to learn whether personal obligation or control information is more important to high PWEs in making their social attributions. However, as mentioned in the preceding discussion of the literature, it is not possible to offer unequivocal hypotheses about high PWE's preference in this instance. Furthermore, because of the lack of research examining the PWE and social attributions for situations with a promotion focus, it was not possible to offer unequivocal hypotheses about how informational preferences may vary depending on the nature of the situation in which they are evaluating another person (prevention versus promotion focus).

Method

Participants

A total of 99 undergraduates (74 females and 25 males) from the University of Florida psychology subject pool were recruited via sign-up sheets in the lobby of the Psychology Building. They received credit toward fulfilling their experimental participation requirement for the introductory psychology course. I ran these participants in group sessions ranging between three and seven participants in a 30-minute session.

Design

This study is a 2 (situational motivation: striving for success/promotion focus vs. avoiding failure/prevention focus) x 2 (PWE score: high or low) x 3 (type of responsibility information: obligation, control, or goal clarity) x 3 (wording of information: positive/success, negative/failure, or neutral), split-plot factorial design, with repeated measures on the latter two variables.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were the rank ordering of questions in terms of their importance in judging another person's responsibility in a situation, and the rating of each question's valuableness in making such an assessment.

Procedure

Participants were informed that their task in this study was to serve as an academic advisor who must determine how much responsibility parents believe their students have for either making the Dean's List (striving for success), or avoiding academic probation (avoiding failure). In trying to reach a fair and accurate decision, they would have only a limited amount of time and resources. In order to gather the information necessary to make this assessment, participants would, in order of importance, rank order 21 questions that they want answered before judging how responsible parents believe their students were for either making the Dean's List or avoiding academic probation. Each one of these 21 questions tapped into one of the three types of responsibility information--seven questions pertained to the prescription-identity link, seven questions pertained to the identity-event link, and

seven questions pertained to the prescription-event link. Within the set of seven questions pertaining to each type of responsibility information, two were worded in a positive/success manner (e.g., one obligation question read, "How much of an obligation does your son/daughter have to do well academically?"), two were worded in a negative/failure manner (e.g., another obligation question read, "How much of an obligation does your son/daughter have to avoid doing poorly academically? "), and three were worded in a neutral manner (e.g., one obligation question read, "How much do you think your son/daughter should care about his/her grades?"). These 21 questions appear in Appendix B. These questions were presented in the same order to all participants. I randomized the order of these questions by numbering them consecutively, and then generated a random number sequence on those numbers and gave them to participants in that randomized order. As evidenced in Appendix B, the instructions asked participants to read all 21 questions before ranking them in terms of their importance in making this assessment.

After rank ordering the 21 questions, participants rated each of them on how valuable they thought it was in making an assessment of how responsible parents believe their students are for making the Dean's List or avoiding academic probation. Participants made their ratings on a (1) valueless to (5) extremely valuable scale. Finally, participants completed the Mirels and Garrett (1971) PWE Scale. Half of the participants completed this measure before making their rankings and judgments of valuableness, and half of the participants completed it after making their ranking and judgments of valuableness.

Upon completing these materials, I fully debriefed each participant, informed each fully about the purpose of the study, as well as when and where s/he may learn the study's results

Results

One participant did not complete the PWE scale, thus, this person was excluded from all analyses that examined the PWE Results of participants' ranking of the 21 questions will be presented first, followed by the presentation of their judgments of the valuableness of these questions. Of course, for both sets of results, my primary focus was on the Protestant Work Ethic. Descriptive statistics for this measure appear in Table 1 An independent samples t-test revealed no differences in PWE scores between participants who completed the scale before (M = 86 8, SD = 11 7) or after (M = 86 8 SD = 10 7) making their rankings and ratings of valuableness, $t(96) = 02$, $p > 97$

Ranking Data

I analyzed these data in several different ways First, I took an average ranking for each piece of responsibility information (obligation, control, and clarity), and crossed this variable with wording of question (positive, negative, or neutral), situational motivation (striving for success or trying to avoid failure), and PWE scores (high or low) in a 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA. PWE scores were analyzed using a median split on participants' scores on this measures (for high PWEs, M = 95.3, range = 122-87 = 35, for low PWEs M = 78 0 range = 87-57 = 30) Participants who scored at the median were arbitrarily assigned to the high or low PWE group

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Protestant Work Ethic in Study 1

N = 98

Mean = 86 8

Standard Deviation = 11 4

Median = 87 0

Mode = 87 0

Range = 122 - 57 = 65

25th percentile = 80 0

75th percentile = 94 0

Cronbach s Alpha = 0 73

This first analysis provided an opportunity not only to examine my experimental hypothesis, but also to learn about the influence of situational motivation and wording of questions on preferences for information in judging another person's responsibility in that situation. Of primary interest was the interaction between type of responsibility information and PWE. This interaction was not significant, $F(2, 186) = 0.17$, $p > .80$. Thus, the first hypothesis was not supported. Because the first experimental hypothesis focused on this interaction term, I have presented means for this analysis in Table 2.

There are at least two reasons why this analysis did not reveal any significant results. First is that the hypothesis is simply wrong. Indeed, the hypothesis may be wrong for a very pragmatic reason. Suppose that a particular participant ranked an obligation question as most important, then perhaps with that piece of information in hand, s/he would have ranked a piece of clarity information as second most important. Armed with obligation and clarity information, s/he may next choose a question pertaining to control. If most participants behaved in such a manner, but picked a different type of question as most important, then it follows that the average rankings would be approximately equivalent.

It is possible, though, that the hypothesis is basically correct, despite the lack of support I found for it. Suppose a participant chooses only control questions as his or her top three choices. With those control questions in-hand, perhaps s/he ranked the remaining four control questions toward the bottom of the importance list, and consequently on average, control questions were as important as obligation and clarity

Table 2 Mean Ranking for Each Type of Responsibility Information as a Function of Protestant Work Ethic Scores[a]

	Protestant Work Ethic			
	High (N = 49)		Low (N = 49)	
Type of Responsibility Information	M[b]	SD	M	SD
Obligation	10 7	2 5	10 9	2 8
Control	11 1	2 2	10 7	2 6
Clarity	10 9	2 9	11 4	3 0

[a] Lower numbers indicate greater importance placed on the type of responsibility information

[b] Because three participants failed to rank-order all of the questions, this average does not equal 11

questions. Thus, perhaps rather than examine the mean rankings, one should examine the type of responsibility information that participants ranked most highly.

In an attempt to probe the data more thoroughly and circumvent these potential problems, I performed four additional sets of analyses. These analyses involved frequency counts and reflected my interest in the interaction of the Triangle components and PWE scores. For these analyses, I recorded the number of participants who ranked each piece of information as the single most important question to which they desired an answer. I divided participants into high and low PWEs based on a median split of their PWE scores. The second related frequency count was similar to the first, with the addition of the condition to which participants were randomly assigned (striving for success or trying to avoid failure). After doing these two frequency counts, I made two more frequency counts that were identical to the first two frequency counts, except that I recorded the top three questions to which participants sought answers rather than only the top ranked question. Because there were three pieces of responsibility information investigated, it might be the case that the "typical" participant would rank one obligation, one control, and one clarity question in his or her top three choices. Thus, I was interested in any significant deviations from this pattern, and how such deviations might be related to the PWE and/or experimental condition.

The results of these counts for the single most important question to which participants sought answers appear in Tables 3 and 4. I performed chi-square tests on these counts. The counts for type of information ranked as most important as a

Table 3 Frequency Counts For First Ranked Question as a Function of PWE and Type of Responsibility Information

Type of Responsibility Information	Protestant Work Ethic: High (N = 49)	Protestant Work Ethic: Low (N = 49)	Total
Obligation	17 (17)	17 (17)	34
Control	13 (14)	15 (14)	28
Clarity	19 (18)	17 (18)	36
Total	49	49	98

Note. Numbers not in parentheses are actual counts; numbers in parentheses are expected counts.

Table 4 Frequency Counts For First Ranked Question as a Function of PWE, Type of Responsibility Information, and Situational Motivation

Type of Responsibility Information	High PWE		Low PWE		
	Success	Failure	Success	Failure	Total
Obligation	10 (8 67)	7 (8 33)	9 (8 67)	8 (8 33)	34
Control	7 (7 14)	6 (6 86)	8 (7 14)	7 (6 86)	28
Clarity	8 (9 18)	11 (8 82)	8 (9 18)	9 (8 82)	36
Total	25	24	25	24	98

Note. Numbers not in parentheses are actual counts, numbers in parentheses are expected counts

function of PWE score are displayed in Table 3, no significant differences emerged, $\chi^2(2, N = 98) = 1.50$, $p > .20$. The counts for type of information ranked as most important as a function of PWE score and experimental condition appear in Table 4, again, no significant difference emerged, $\chi^2(2, N = 98) = 0.30$, $p > .20$. Consequently, when examining the type of information ranked as most important, the first hypothesis was not supported.

The results of my counts for the three most important questions to which participants sought answers appear in Tables 5 and 6. Once again, I performed a chi-square analysis on these counts. Table 5 contains the counts for type of information ranked as most important as a function of PWE score; no significant differences emerged, $\chi^2(2, N = 294) = 3.25$, $p > .10$. Table 6 contains the counts for type of information ranked as most important as a function of PWE score and experimental condition, again, no significant difference emerged, $\chi^2(2, N = 294) = 0.66$, $p > .20$. Consequently, when examining the top three ranked questions, the first hypothesis was not supported.

Although the first hypothesis was not supported, my original 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA on the rank ordering of the 21 questions revealed several other significant effects. First, there was an interaction between type of responsibility information and situational motivation, $F(2, 186) = 3.65$, $p < .03$. The mean rankings can be viewed in Table 7. Specifically, within the striving for success condition, obligation information was ranked more highly than clarity information, $t(97) = 2.20$, $p < .05$ (this and all subsequent t-tests are two tailed). However, within the trying to avoid failure

Table 5 Frequency Counts For First Three Ranked Questions as a Function of PWE and Type of Responsibility Information

Type of Responsibility Information	Protestant Work Ethic: High (N = 49)	Protestant Work Ethic: Low (N = 49)	Total
Obligation	52 (55)	58 (55)	110
Control	41 (38 5)	36 (38 5)	77
Clarity	54 (53 5)	53 (53 5)	107
Total	147	147	294

Note. Numbers not in parentheses are actual counts, numbers in parentheses are expected counts

Table 6 Frequency Counts For First Three Ranked Questions as a Function of PWE, Type of Responsibility Information, and Situational Motivation

Type of Responsibility Information	High PWE		Low PWE		Total
	Success	Failure	Success	Failure	
Obligation	29 (28 06)	23 (26 94)	33 (28 06)	25 (26 94)	110
Control	21 (19 64)	20 (18 86)	16 (19 64)	20 (18.86)	77
Clarity	25 (27 30)	29 (26.20)	26 (27 30)	27 (26 20)	107
Total	75	72	75	72	294

Note Numbers not in parentheses are actual counts; numbers in parentheses are expected counts

Table 7 Mean Ranking for Type of Responsibility Information as a Function of Situational Motivation[a]

Type of Responsibility Information	Situational Motivation: Striving for Success M	SD	Trying to Avoid Failure M	SD
Obligation	10 4	2 8	11 2	2 5
Control	10 8	2.2	11 0	2.6
Clarity	11 6	2 7	10 1	2 9

[a]Lower numbers indicate greater importance placed on the type of responsibility information

condition, clarity information was ranked higher than obligation information, $t(97) = 2.06$, $p < .05$. Finally, clarity information was ranked higher in the trying to avoid failure condition than in the striving for success condition, $t(96) = 2.68$, $p < .01$. From these data, it appears that people are perhaps more interested in learning about factors that are not identity relevant to the individual when trying to assess his or her responsibility in a failure-oriented situation, whereas they are more interested in information about identity-relevant factors when trying to assess his or her responsibility in a success-oriented situation. Perhaps when perceiving another person in a failure- oriented situation, people want to learn about identity-irrelevant factors that could contribute to the failure so as to avoid, minimize, or compensate for such factors if in a similar situation themselves. Similarly, because obligation consists of feelings of duty, something internal to an individual, perhaps when perceiving another person in a success-oriented situation, people want to learn about the person they are judging so as to know what personal characteristics are needed to perform well should they find themselves in a similar situation. Of course, such interpretation is speculative.

Participants also ranked more highly neutrally- and positively worded questions (Ms = 9.7 and 10.0, respectively) to negatively-worded questions (M = 13.5), $F(2, 186) = 26.28$, $p < .0001$. This main effect was qualified by an interaction of question wording with situational motivation, $F(2, 186) = 5.72$, $p < .005$. Specifically, as evidenced in Table 8, participants showed an preference for neutrally- or positively-worded questions based on situational motivation; however, participants

Table 8 Mean Ranking for Question Wording as a Function of Situational Motivation[a]

	Situational Motivation			
	Striving for Success		Trying to Avoid Failure	
Wording of Question	M	SD	M	SD
Positive	9.7	1.8	10.4	1.9
Negative	14.3	2.6	12.7	2.2
Neutral	9.5	1.7	9.8	1.5

[a]Lower numbers indicate greater importance placed on the type of responsibility information.

ranked more highly negatively-worded questions in the trying to avoid failure condition than in the striving for success condition, $t(48) = 3.33$, $p < .05$. Likewise, although the comparison between situational motivation was not significant for the positively-worded questions, they were ranked slightly higher in the striving for success condition than in the trying to avoid failure condition. Given people's tendency to seek out information that supports their initial hypotheses in a situation (e.g., Snyder, 1984), it is perhaps not surprising that people rank as important information that is more meaningful or relevant to the hypotheses they are testing. To elaborate, if an academic advisor is trying to understand why a student did well in a class, s/he is more likely to ask the child and/or teacher about positive behaviors the child may have displayed (e.g., answering questions in class, turning in quality homework assignments) than to ask about problems the child may have been having (e.g., falling asleep in class, failing to turn in homework assignments).

In conducting my ANOVAs, one problem existed. The mean ranking for each type of responsibility information was related to the mean ranking for the other two types of responsibility information. That is, once I knew the mean rankings for two of the three types of responsibility information, the mean for the third piece of responsibility information was, in effect, already known. However, this analysis is one that is not uncommon to use when examining rank-ordered data as a function of experimental conditions (James Algina, personal communication, June 3, 1999).

Valuableness Data

I next analyzed the data pertaining to how valuable participants perceived each of the 21 questions As I did with my initial analysis of the ranking data, I first took an average valuableness score for each of the three types of responsibility information and crossed this variable with wording of question (positive negative, or neutral), situational motivation (striving for success or trying to avoid failure) and PWE scores (high or low) in a 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA PWE scores were classified as high or low based on a median split on participants' scores on this measure. Given the second experimental hypothesis, of primary interest was the interaction between type of responsibility information and PWE. Once again, this interaction was not significant, $F(2, 188) = 0.18$, $p > .80$ Thus, the second hypothesis was not supported. Because the second experimental hypothesis focused on this interaction term, I have presented means for this analysis in Table 9

Two significant effects did emerge in this analysis As with the ranking data, participants tended to rate as more valuable the neutrally and positively-worded questions (Ms = 3.7 and 3.6 respectively) than the negatively-worded questions (M = 3.1), $F(2, 188) = 20.09$, $p < .0001$ Also mirroring the ranking data, this main effect was qualified by an interaction of question wording with situational motivation, $F(2, 188) = 6.52$, $p < .004$ Specifically as evidenced in Table 10, participants perceived the positively and neutrally-worded questions as more valuable than the negatively worded questions in the striving for success condition, for the complex contrast, $t(49) = 5.73$, $p < .01$ In the trying to avoid failure condition however participants found

Table 9 Mean Valuableness Rating for Each Type of Responsibility Information as a Function of Protestant Work Ethic Scores[a]

Type of Responsibility Information	Protestant Work Ethic			
	High (N = 49)		Low (N = 49)	
	M	SD	M	SD
Obligation	3 4	0 7	3.5	0 7
Control	3.6	0 6	3 6	0 6
Clarity	3 6	0 8	3 3	0 7

[a] Scores range from 1 (valueless) to 5 (extremely valuable).

Table 10 Mean Valuableness Rating for Question Wording as a Function of Situational Motivation[a]

	Situational Motivation			
	Striving for Success		Trying to Avoid Failure	
Wording of Question	M	SD	M	SD
Positive	3 7	0 5	3 5	0.6
Negative	3 0	0 8	3 3	0 8
Neutral	3 7	0.5	3 7	0 5

[a] Scores range from 1 (valueless) to 5 (extremely valuable)

no difference between positively- and negatively-worded questions, $t(48) = 1.92$, $p > .05$. They did rate negatively worded items as less valuable than neutrally-worded items, $t(48) = 3.75$, $p < .05$. Thus, it appears from both the ranking data and the valuableness data that participants found questions worded toward failure to be of less use in assessing another person's responsibility in a situation, and that this is particularly the case when that person is trying to accomplish some sort of goal, as opposed to trying to avoid some sort of failure.

Summary of Study 1

This study attempted to discern what type(s) of responsibility information people prefer to have at their disposal when evaluating another person as a function of their endorsement of the Protestant Work Ethic. Given 21 questions to which they could have answers, participants both rank-ordered these questions, and rated them individually on how valuable they perceived each one to be.

In rank-ordering the 21 questions, participants ranked obligation questions as more important than clarity questions when trying to evaluate someone who was striving for success. However, participants ranked clarity questions as more important than obligation questions when trying to evaluate someone who was trying to avoid failure. When rating each question's valuableness, this result was not replicated. It may be the case that when ranking information, people are forced to prioritize it, and this constraint leads them to process the information more carefully than when rating information for its valuableness. When rating information for its valuableness,

however, participants may have assumed they would have unlimited access to all information available, and thus the findings in the rank-ordered data were eliminated.

Schlenker et al (1994) found that when people had unrestricted access to all three types of responsibility information they chose to have obligation and control information at their disposal more frequently than clarity information in evaluating a central character This result was not found in the current study's ranking data or valuableness data. Obligation information was ranked higher than clarity information only when evaluating a character who was trying to accomplish a goal, when evaluating a character was trying to avoid a failure clarity information was ranked higher than obligation information. Thus, the current research suggests that the evaluative context (striving for success or trying to avoid failure) is a determinant in the type of responsibility information people prefer to have in their assessment of another person's responsibility

It should also be noted that Schlenker et al s (1994) participants had different demands placed on them than I placed on my participants Specifically, Schlenker et al.'s participants were asked to gather information about a central character's potential role in his company's failure to reach its sales goal That character may have been involved not at all in the failure (e g., perhaps he swept the loading docks), or he may have been involved significantly in the failure (e g , he was a district sales manager) Thus, for Schlenker et al 's participants, identity relevant information (i.e , obligation and control) may have been particularly crucial to have their disposal In the present study though, the central character was a student, who clearly was

involved in either making the Dean's List (the striving for success condition) or avoiding academic probation (the trying to avoid failure condition). Thus, to my participants, identity-relevant information may have been less crucial than it was to Schlenker et al.'s participants, and so my participants were, at least in the trying to avoid failure condition, more apt to rank clarity information higher than obligation or control information.

It was also found in the rank-ordering data that participants trying to evaluate someone striving for success tended to prefer questions that emphasized achievement over those that emphasized avoiding failure; the reverse was found for participants trying to evaluate someone striving to avoid failure. In ratings of valuableness, though, this finding was far less robust. Thus, it appears that when people have to prioritize what information they would like to evaluate someone, they take into account the nature of the evaluation, that is, whether the person is striving for success or trying to avoid a failure, as might be expected from research on people's tendency to seek out information that confirms their hypotheses in a social situation (Snyder, 1984). When simply rating a question's valuableness, the nature of the evaluation becomes less important, perhaps because people believe that they will have access to all of the information they are rating. However, when having to prioritize such information, people will choose that information that is congruent with the evaluative situation. It must be realized that ranked-order data can exaggerate differences between the categories of the data being ranked. Participants were forced to make choices between the questions presented to them. As discussed previously, the

numerical rankings assigned to each question were not mutually exclusive data. Thus, by ranking one question highly another question must be ranked lower In the valuableness data, this was not the case, as rating one question as valuable did not mean that participants had to rate another question as less valuable.

In none of these analyses did any effects emerge pertaining to PWE. The reported results used a median split to categorize participants as high or low on the PWE scale. However, even when I analyzed only those participants scoring the top and bottom quartiles on the PWE scale no significant results could be discerned Likewise, when analyzing PWE as a continuous variable, it did not yield any significant effects either alone or in combination with the other variables. Although it is possible that PWE is unrelated to a specific type of responsibility information, it may also be that this study did not tap into the PWE "mindset" (Furnham, 1990a, p 155) as adequately as I had hoped. For instance, much, if not all, previous research on PWE and social attributions has examined directly the hypothesized link between PWE and reasons for a particular social ill In this study, however, I asked high and low PWEs to select questions to which they would like to have answers at their disposal in assessing another person's perceptions of a third party's responsibility in a situation Perhaps high and low PWEs do indeed differ in the type of responsibility information that they themselves prefer to have when assessing another person's responsibility in a situation, but perhaps they do not differ when asking for such information from other people Likewise, perhaps high PWEs differ from lows in how they use the answers to such questions if, for the sake of illustration, I may assume

that high PWE do prefer obligation and control information to clarity information, this does not necessarily mean that they presume others share their preferenae Hence, I was unable to detect any effect of PWE in this study Even if I had detected an effect of PWE, it does not mean that high and low PWEs process the same objectiva information in a similar manner Thus, a second study was theo conducted to examine which type(s) of responsibility informatioo tends to be inferred by high and low PWEs.

STUDY 2

The first study assessed the type of responsibility information high and low PWE individuals prefer to ask others when evaluating a central character. In essence, Study 1 examined what type of information will be sought out when people have the opportunity to do so. The second study assessed what types of responsibility information high and low PWE individuals tend to infer in a given situation with a limited amount of responsibility information present. As is often the case in social interactions, participants may not have all of the information necessary to judge another person, and therefore must "fill-in" the missing information. In Gestalt psychological terminology (Wertheimer, 1923/1967), social interactants frequently must use closure when dealing with other people. In attributional theory terminology social interactants frequently must ' fill in any missing details" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 98) when dealing with other people. Participants in Study 2 were asked to do precisely this.

Two types of theoretically-grounded hypotheses can be offered for this study. The first set of hypotheses concerns effects of the Triangle Model, and the second set of hypotheses concerns effects of the Protestant Work Ethic in combination with the Triangle Model.

Hypotheses Regarding the Triangle Model

Schlenker et al. (1994) demonstrated that when the strength of any of the linkages is strong as opposed to weak people perceived a central character to be more determined more committed to the task, and more responsible. Furthermore, Schlenker (1997) contends that " responsibility engages the self system, so people usually become more motivated to accomplish the prescribed goal" (p 265, original in italics). If I make the reasonable assumption that, all other factors being equal, motivated people usually perform better on a task than unmotivated people, then the following hypothesis can offered

H1 With respect to strength of link, participants who read about a situation in which there is either strong obligation control, or clarity will estimate the central character's likelihood of success to be higher and infer that the central character is more psychologically engaged in the task than will participants who read about a situation in which there is either weak obligation, control, or clarity

The way in which an individual performs on a task has implications for how s/he feels about him- or herself Thus, I also investigated participants' perceptions of the central character's affect depending upon his or her task performance. It may be that participants who read about a situation with strong obligation, control, or clarity also believe that the central character will experience more positive affect for a quality performance, and more negative affect for a poor performance than will participants who read about a situation in which there is weak obligation, control, or clarity However it might also be the case that perceivers will think a central character should experience more positive affect if a quality performance occurs

despite performing in a situation with weak obligation, control, or clarity Similarly, perhaps perceivers will think that a central character should experience less positive affect if a quality performance occurs in the presence of strong obligation, control or clarity because the performance could then be attributed to these factors. These latter possibilities are indirectly supported by Kelley's (1967) notions of discounting and augmentation Specifically, perceivers discount the role an actor played in a success to the extent that it appears that external factors contributed to the success, and they discount the role an actor played in a failure to the extent it appears that external factors contributed to the failure Likewise, perceivers tend to augment the role an actor played in a success to the extent that external factors inhibited his or her ability to succeed on the task, and they will augment the role an actor played in a failure to the extent that external factors facilitated his or her ability to succeed on the task Based on Kelley's notions of discounting and augmentation, the following hypothesis is offered

> **H2:** Participants will believe that the central character should experience less positive affect for a quality performance when reading about a situation in which there is either strong obligation, control or clarity than when reading about a situation in which there is weak obligation, control, or clarity Similarly, participants will believe that the central character should experience more negative affect for a poor performance when reading about a situation in which there is either strong obligation, control, or clarity than when reading about a situation in which there is weak obligation, control, or clarity

In their initial research on the Triangle Model, Schlenker et al (1994) found that people tended to prefer obligation and control information to clarity information

when choosing among all three types of responsibility information when evaluating a central character's performance. They attributed this finding in part to the fundamental attribution error (Hoge, 1997, Jones & Harris, 1967), which reflects people's tendency to overestimate identity-relevant information relative to nonidentity-relevant information when making attributions for the causes of other people's behavior when no responsibility information is known. I expect that this tendency will persist when people are presented with only one piece of responsibility information. Consequently, the following hypothesis is offered.

H3: There will be a main effect of type of responsibility information inferred, such that participants will tend to infer more information internal to the actor as opposed to information external to the actor. In terms of the Triangle Model, people will tend to infer more obligation than control information, and more control information than clarity information.

Hypotheses Regarding PWE

High PWEs seem to consider work to be more of an obligation (Cherrington, 1980) and have a more internal locus of control (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) than low PWEs. Thus, I argue that obligation and control will dominate the inferences made by high PWEs, as compared to those made by low PWEs. In general, high PWEs will tend to infer that actors have greater amounts of obligation and control than will low PWEs. Further, high PWEs will emphasize obligation and control information more than goal clarity information, whereas low PWEs will infer comparable amounts of all three types of responsibility information. The following specific hypotheses are offered regarding PWE:

H4 High PWE individuals will infer that the central character has a greater obligation to perform well and to control the situation than will low PWE individuals No differences are expected between high and low PWEs in their inferences of goal clarity These effects will hold regardless of whether there is information given about a central character's obligation, control, or goal clarity

H5 High PWE individuals will infer that the central character's obligation and control are even stronger than goal clarity Low PWE individuals, in contrast, will infer comparable amounts of all three types of information These effects will hold regardless of whether there is information given about a central character's obligation, control or goal clarity

Furthermore, as mentioned, prior research (e g , Furnham, 1982) has demonstrated that the PWE is associated with the tendency to attribute social ills such as unemployment to those suffering from such ills. Other research (e.g., Heaven, 1990) has demonstrated that the PWE is associated with the tendency to recommend "heavy-handed" solutions to such ills. One possible reason for such attributions is that high PWEs tend to value responsibility more than low PWEs (Furnham, 1987) With such a value may go certain expectations. For instance, Schlenker (1997) contends that responsibility is related to greater determination Thus, a person who values responsibility may assume that others are determined to do well on the tasks that they undertake. Such determination leads to expetations for success, and when that expectation is met, positive affect should result Likewise, should that expectation not be met, negative affect should result. Consequently, the following hypothesis is offered.

H6 High PWE individuals will perceive the central character as more likely to be successful...as more engaged psychologically with the task at hand...and as experiencing more positive affect for a

quality performance, but more negative affect for a poor performance than will low PWE individuals

In addition to testing these hypotheses, this experiment was able to discern whether high PWEs tend to infer more obligation or control information when both types of information were missing (i.e , participants were given no responsibility information, or were given only goal clarity information). However, I could not offer unequivocal, theoretically-grounded hypotheses about high PWE's preference for obligation versus control information.

Method

Participants

A total of 274 undergraduates (184 females and 90 males) from the University of Florida psychology subject pool were recruited via sign-up sheets in the lobby of the Psychology Building They received credit toward fulfilling their experimental participation requirement for the introductory psychology course

Design

The experimental design is a 3 (link presented obligation, control, or goal clarity) x 2 (strength of link presented strong or weak) x 2 (PWE score high or low) x 2 (type of vignette job applicant and student) mixed model factorial In addition, there was one group of participants (an offset control group) who received no link information whatsoever This group was included to learn what type(s) of responsibility information people tend to infer when they are not biased by any other

responsibility information. The link presented, strength of the link, and PWE score were between-subject variables, and type of vignette was a within-subject variable.

Materials

Appendix C contains each manipulation of the two vignettes that served as the primary stimulus materials for this experiment. These vignettes describe (a) a person who is applying for a job, and (b) a student who is taking a college course. Participants read the same version of both of these scenarios (that is, I manipulated the same link as either strong or weak in each scenario for each participant). In addition, as in study 1, participants completed the Mirels and Garrett (1971) Protestant Work Ethic Scale.

Dependent Variables

After reading each vignette, participants completed an evaluation of the central character and his or her situation. Participants made all evaluations on 1 (low)-to-7 (high) scales. These evaluations consisted of 11 items that assessed seven dependent variables. These items appear in Appendix D.

The first three dependent variables were estimates of how much the central character had (1) an obligation to perform well on the task, (2) control over the task, and (3) clear rules and procedures to follow in performing the task. For participants who read vignettes in which a link is manipulated as strong or weak, the appropriate measures were also used as manipulation checks of link strength.

The fourth dependent variable was an estimate of how successful the central character would be on the task. This measure consisted of one rating that asked

participants to estimate how successful they think the central character would be ranging from very successful to very unsuccessful

The fifth dependent variable was a measure of the central character's psychological engagement in the situation This measure consisted of three items These items asked participants to judge how hard the central character will try on the task how personally committed the central character is to doing well on the task, and how much personal responsibility the central character has for his or her performance in the situation. Because this dependent variable consisted of three ratings, scores on it could range from 3 to 21

The sixth dependent variable was a measure of how much positive affect the central character should experience if s/he performs well at the task This measure consisted of two items One item was a measure of how much credit the central character should receive should s/he perform well at the task, and the second was a measure of how much pride the central character should feel should s/he perform well at the task. Because this dependent variable consisted of two ratings scores on it could range from 2 to 14

The seventh dependent variable was a measure of how much negative affect the central character should feel if s/he performs poorly at the task This measure consisted of two items One item was a measure of how much blame the central character should receive should s/he perform poorly at the task, and the second was a measure of how disappointed the central character should be in him- or herself if s/he

performs poorly at the task. Because this dependent variable consisted of two ratings scores on it could range from 2 to 14

As evidenced in Appendix C the vignettes were written with no information given about the central character's performance in the situation. Thus for these latter two dependent variables, participants were asked to envision both the quality and poor performances.

Exploratory Measures

In addition to the two vignettes and PWE scale, participants also completed some exploratory measures after completing all of the aforementioned materials These exploratory measures were the Richins and Dawson (1992) Materialism as an Individual Value Orientation, Kasser and Ryan's (1993) Life Aspirations Scale, and Wrightsman's (1964) Philosophies of Human Nature assessment. The Life Aspirations Scale consists of four particular aspirations self-acceptance, affiliation with others community feeling, and financial success. The Philosophies of Human Nature Scale consists of six subscales; however, because of potential time limitations, only four of these six were used These four subscales were the beliefs that people are trustworthy, altruistic, independent from others and rational These exploratory measures were included simply to better understand, as Furnham (1990b) called it, the PWE "mindset" (p 182). Each one of these exploratory measures can be viewed in Appendices E, F, and G, respectively

Procedure

I ran participants in group sessions that ranged between six and 22 participants in a 50-minute session. Upon arriving for this investigation, participants were informed that this was a study examining the effects of personal attitudes on impressions formed of other people. Prior to completing the experimental materials, participants read and signed an informed consent detailing the basic procedure to be followed during the experimental session, and the benefit (experimental participation credit) that they would receive in exchange for their efforts. Participants read the same version (i.e., treatment condition) of each of the two vignettes. After reading one vignette, participants completed the dependent measures for that vignette, after which they repeated the process for the next vignette. The order in which the vignettes were presented to participants was counterbalanced. In addition, participants completed the Mirels and Garrett (1971) measure of the PWE. Half of the participants completed this measure before reading their vignettes, and half of the participants completed it after reading their vignettes. Participants completed the exploratory measures only after finishing the materials of primary interest.

Upon completing these materials, I fully debriefed participants, informed them about the true purpose of the study and when they may learn the study's results.

Results

Protestant Work Ethic

Because of the primary focus on the Protestant Work Ethic, descriptive statistics for this variable appear in Table 11. As can be discerned by comparing these statistics with those of the first study, both samples were quite similar in terms of their results on this scale. An independent-samples t test revealed that there was no effect on PWE scores of the order in which participants completed the scale (i.e., before or after reading the vignettes), $t(272) = .09$, $p > .89$. In addition, there was no relationship between PWE and age of participants, $r(273) = .06$, $p > .30$, or sex of participants (for females, $M = 86.1$, $SD = 12.3$, for males, $M = 88.0$, $SD = 11.3$), $t(272) = 1.18$, $p < .24$.

Manipulation Checks

Perceptions of the central character's obligation, control, and goal clarity served as major dependent variables relevant to the first three hypotheses. In addition, responses on these items provided assessments of the effectiveness of the manipulations of the strength of each link. Before turning to more complete analyses of each, along with tests of the hypotheses, it is worth checking to be sure that the manipulations were effective. Therefore, independent samples t-tests were conducted to see if the manipulation of the strength of each link worked. These tests showed that

Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for the Protestant Work Ethic in Study 2

N = 274

Mean = 86 7

Standard Deviation = 12.0

Median = 87 0

Mode = 86 0

Range = 123 - 54 = 69

25th percentile = 79 0

75th percentile = 94 0

Cronbach's Alpha = 0 72

each link was successfully manipulated, for the strong links, Ms = 5 9, 5 8, and 6 2 for obligation, control, and clarity, respectively, whereas for the weak links, Ms = 3 8 4 1, and 2 2 for obligation, control, and clarity, respectively, all ts > 5 40, all ps < 001

Tests of Hypotheses

To test my hypotheses, for the dependent measures of obligation, control, and clarity, I ran a 3 (link presented: obligation, control, or clarity) x 2 (strength of link strong or weak) x 2 (PWE score: high or low) ANOVA. In addition, I included an offset control group who received no link or strength of link information to learn what type(s) of responsibility information high and low PWEs infer when not primed by another type of responsibility information. Participants were classified as high or low PWE based on a median split of their scores on this scale (for high PWEs, M = 96 2, range = 123-87 = 36; for low PWEs, M = 77 6, range = 87 54 = 33). Those participants scoring at the median were arbitrarily classified as high or low PWE prior to running any analyses with this variable. In addition to analyzing the PWE via a median split, I also ran each ANOVA with PWE entered as a continuous variable. For these latter ANOVAs, PWE scores were centered prior to running the analyses. I will report any differences in results with respect to the method of analyzing PWE. For the sake of clarity and ease of presentation in the numerous tables to be discussed, the median split analyses will serve as the primary results to be reported.

The other four dependent variables were investigated via the same procedure. This resulted in estimates of success, psychological engagement, positive affect for a

quality performance, and negative affect for a poor performance each being entered into a 3 (link presented) x 2 (strength of link) x 2 (PWE score) ANOVA After running each of these seven ANOVAs, I conducted appropriate follow up tests to probe my hypothesis and dissect all significant interactions It should be noted that the cell sizes were not equal in most analyses. This was the result of a slightly unequal number of participants being assigned to the different experimental conditions and of using a median split on PWE scores. In addition, high and low PWEs did not fall into the experimental conditions in equal numbers (ns ranged from 37 to 42 for the seven experimental conditions)

While I entered scenario as a variable in these initial analyses, there were only scattered effects of this variable. However, these effects did not qualify any of the results I am about to present, nor did they produce any conceptually intriguing patterns of results and none involved interactions with the PWE Consequently, the major analyses about to be reported collapsed across this variable. After presenting the results of the seven ANOVAs and the specific contrasts, I will discuss differences between the two scenarios.

Responsibility Links

The first three dependent variables that I will discuss are those of obligation, control, and clarity, respectively Means for these first three ANOVAs appear in Tables 12 through 14

Obligation

On the obligation dependent variable Table 12 reveals a main effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 39.06$, $p < .0001$, such that participants inferred greater obligation when reading about a strong link than a weak link. There was also a main effect of type of responsibility information, $F(2, 260) = 7.86$, $p < .0005$. Participants who read about a central character's obligations perceived that character's obligation to be weaker than participants who read about a central character's control, clarity, or who were given no responsibility information. This effect is simply the result of the obligation manipulation. Inspection of Table 12 reveals that participants who read about a central character with a weak obligation in a situation found that character's obligation to be much weaker than did participants who read about a character who lacked control over or who did not enjoy clarity in that situation.

The two main effects of strength of link and type of responsibility information on perceived obligation were qualified by an interaction between these variables, $F(2, 260) = 17.56$, $p < .0001$, such that participants tended to rate the character's obligation as much lower when in the weak obligation condition than in either the weak control or weak clarity conditions, $F(2, 110) = 17.88$, $p < .001$ (for weak obligation versus weak control, $t(74) = 5.71$, $p < .01$, for weak obligation versus weak clarity, $t(73) = 3.76$, $p < .01$). However, participants in the strong obligation condition did not rate the character's obligation to be higher than participants in the high control or high clarity conditions, $F(2, 118) = 1.65$, $p < .20$. When given information that either a

Table 12 Perceived Obligation as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs	5.5
	Low PWEs	5.1
	Overall	5.3

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.8
Low PWE	5.7	5.2	5.8	5.5
Overall	5.9	5.5	5.7	5.7
Weak Link				
High PWE	3.6	5.7	5.3	5.0
Low PWE	3.9	5.3	4.7	4.6
Overall	3.8	5.5	5.0	4.8

[a] Scores ranged from 1 (lowest obligation) to 7 (highest obligation)

person has control in a situation, or that clear rules exist in that situation, then perceivers may assume an obligation to perform in that situation. Likewise, even when told that a person lacks control over a situation, or that the rules in the situation are unclear, perceivers tend to assume that the actor is still obligated to do well relative to perceivers who were told explicitly that the central character lacked obligation in the situation. One distinction between the present research and past research conducted explicitly on the fundamental attribution is noteworthy. Whereas previous research on the fundamental attribution error (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967) has made the outcome of an actor's behavior known to participants, this was not the case in the current study. My scenarios simply described an actor's situation, not his or her behavior. Yet participants explicitly told either that the actor lacked control or that there was a lack of clarity in the situation were still prone to assume the actor had an obligation to perform well in the situation.

It also noteworthy that participants in the offset control group rated the character's obligation to be as strong as participants in the strong link conditions, $t(159) = 1.44$, $p > .10$, Dunnett's test (this test was used for all subsequent comparisons involving the offset control group). Furthermore, participants in the offset control condition and participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions also assumed an equal amount of obligation, $t(113) = .72$, $p > .30$. Thus, unless people are explicitly told that a person lacks obligation in a situation, it appears that such information will be assumed, even when the actual behavior of the actor is unknown to perceivers.

In addition, it is interesting to note that participants in the strong goal clarity condition perceived the central character as having greater obligation than did participants in the weak goal clarity condition, $t(74) = 2.61$, $p < .05$. However, participants in the strong and weak control conditions did not differ in their perceptions of the central character's obligation, $t(76) = .05$, $p > .90$. These two contrasts would seem to indicate that people are sensitive to information about the rules/procedures in a situation as they apply to that actor's obligation, if the rules are clear, a person has an implicit obligation to do well, whereas if they are unclear, the person has less obligation to do well.

There was a marginal main effect of PWE, $F(1, 260) = 3.42$, $p < .07$, with high PWEs tending to perceive a central character as having greater obligation in the situation than low PWEs. This marginal main effect of PWE reached $F(1, 260) = 3.63$, $p < .06$ when PWE was entered into the ANOVA as a continuous variable. Thus, although the data were consistent with the fourth hypothesis, the effect was weak.

Control

Table 13 presents means for the control dependent variable. There was a main effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 58.24$, $p < .0001$, such that participants inferred that the character had more control when they read about a strong rather than a weak link. There was also a main effect of type of responsibility information, $F(2, 260) = 8.27$, $p < .0003$. Participants who read about the central character's obligation tended to infer greater control over the situation than did participants who read about the

Table 13 Perceived Control as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs	5 2
	Low PWEs	5 1
	Overall	5 1

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	5 9	5 7	5 7	5 8
Low PWE	5 5	5.8	5 8	5 7
Overall	5 8	5 8	5 7	5 8
Weak Link				
High PWE	5 4	4 1	4.2	4 5
Low PWE	5 5	4 2	4 0	4 6
Overall	5.5	4 1	4 1	4 6

[a] Scores ranged from 1 (lowest control) to 7 (highest control)

character's control or clarity for the complex contrast, $t(232) = 4.14$, $p < .01$. This indicates that the control manipulation affected perceptions of both control and clarity. This is perhaps not surprising given that Schlenker et al. (1994) regarded clarity as a type of control, as clarity pertains to the individual's understanding of the goals and rules in a situation, and control pertains to the individual's acting on this understanding. Should perceivers believe that the rules in a situation are unclear, then it follows logically that they should believe that the individual does not understand what s/he needs to do in the situation.

The two main effects of strength of link and type of responsibility information were qualified by an interaction between the two variables, $F(2, 260) = 8.70$, $p < .0002$. This interaction was driven by differences between participants in the three weak link conditions. Participants in the weak obligation condition judged the character's control over the situation to be greater than did participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions combined, for the complex contrast, $t(111) = 5.86$, $p < .01$. However, there were no differences in perceptions of control among participants reading about a strong link, $F(2, 118) = .07$, $p > .90$. These findings buttress Schlenker et al.'s notion that control and clarity are more similar to each other than to obligation, and from this study, there is particularly true when control or clarity is known to be weak. Furthermore, that obligation and control are both identity-relevant pieces of responsibility information, participants in the weak obligation condition may be inferring greater control so as to maintain the belief that the central character's responsibility in the situation resides in part within the actor.

himself If this was the case, then it bolsters the idea that our tendency to presume identity-relevant information exists even when we do not know the outcome of an actor's situation

It is again interesting to examine the inferences of participants in the offset control group These participants assumed the character had less control over the situation than did participants in the strong link conditions, $t(159) = 3.04$, $p < .05$ However, offset control condition participants assumed the character had as much control as did participants in the weak obligation condition, $t(76) = 1.37$, $p > .10$, and more control than did participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions, $t(113) = 4.40$, $p < .01$

Lastly, on the dependent variable of control, there were no effects of PWE when it was analyzed via a median split. However, when PWE was analyzed as a continuous variable, it was significant, $F(1, 260) = 5.42$, $p < .03$, such that PWE was positively associated with inferring that the central character had control over the situation. Thus, further support for the fourth hypothesis was obtained

Clarity

Table 14 presents the means for the clarity dependent variable There was a main effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 216.06$, $p < .0001$, with participants inferring that the character enjoyed more situational clarity when they read about a strong rather than weak link. There was also a type of responsibility information main effect, $F(2, 260) = 4.33$, $p < .02$ Participants reading about the clarity in a central character's situation tended to see the situational rules as less clear than participants

Table 14 Perceived Clarity as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs	4 4
	Low PWEs	4 2
	Overall	4 3

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	5 1	5 5	6 2	5 6
Low PWE	5 1	5.2	6.5	5 6
Overall	5 1	5 4	6 3	5 6
Weak Link				
High PWE	4 4	3 8	1 9	3 4
Low PWE	4 2	4.2	2 3	3 5
Overall	4 3	4 0	2 2	3.5

[a] Scores ranged from 1 (lowest clarity) to 7 (highest clarity)

reading about the central character's obligation in or control over the situation This effect was the result of the clarity manipulation.

There was, as with the two previous dependent variables, an interaction between strength of link and type of responsibility information, $F(2, 260) = 54.29$, $p < .0001$ Participants in the strong obligation and strong control conditions judged the situational clarity to be equivalent, $t(80) = .48$, $p > .40$ However, participants in the strong clarity condition judged the situation to be clearer than did participants in the strong obligation and high control conditions, for the complex contrast; $t(119) = 5.27$, $p < .01$ Likewise participants in the weak clarity condition judged the situation to be less clear than did participants in the weak obligation and weak control conditions, for the complex contrast, $t(111) = 9.08$, $p < .01$ Thus, it appears that participants were particularly sensitive to the presence of clarity information in the situation

Furthermore, information about obligation and control affected perceptions of clarity in the situation Specifically, participants in the strong obligation condition perceived more clarity in the situation than did participants in the weak obligation condition, $F(1, 78) = 10.64$, $p < .002$, and participants in the strong control condition perceived more clarity in the situation than did participants in the weak control condition, $F(1, 76) = 28.06$, $p < .0001$ In the discussions of the obligation and control dependent variables which are both identity-relevant pieces of information, it was found that participants presented with information that one of these two links was weak tended to infer a greater amount of the other type of responsibility information. However, perceptions of situational clarity, the identity-irrelevant piece of

responsibility information, appear to have been influenced only by the strength of the link (i.e., of the responsibility information) presented to them.

Participants in the offset control condition perceived less clarity in the situation than did participants in the strong link condition, $t(159) = 6.43$, $p < .01$, but they perceived more clarity than did participants in the weak link condition, $t(151) = 4.07$, $p < .01$. If indeed people were objectively processing social information, then intuitively these are the results one would expect to find. However, upon further examination, this latter effect was driven by the fact that participants in the weak clarity condition perceived less clarity in the situation than did the offset control condition participants, $t(73) = 8.56$, $p < .01$; however, there were no differences between participants in the offset control condition and the weak obligation condition, $t(76) = .20$, $p > .50$, and the weak control condition, $t(76) = 1.18$, $p > .20$. These findings again attest to participants' sensitivity to clarity information.

There was no main effect of PWE, $F(1, 260) = .62$, $p > .40$; nor did it interact with either strength of link or type of responsibility information given. PWE was still not significant when entered as a continuous variable, $F(1, 260) = 1.73$, $p > .18$. This null result lends credibility to the fourth hypothesis.

Type of Responsibility Information Inferred

In addition to examining obligation, control, and clarity as separate dependent variables, I wanted to treat this set of variables as a within-subject variable. This would allow comparisons between the three types of responsibility information, how inferences across types of responsibility information are a function of PWE, and how

they change depending upon what type of responsibility information is present in a situation. Thus, this variable was entered as a fourth variable into the original 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA. Table 15 includes all pertinent means.

First, there was a significant effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 200.0$, $p < .0001$, such that people tended to infer more responsibility when any link was strong than when it was weak. This main effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between strength of link and type of responsibility information, $F(2, 260) = 13.82$, $p < .0001$. This interaction was the result of the manipulations. Specifically, participants tended to see a manipulated weak link as weaker than the other two links, and likewise, they tended to see a manipulated strong link as stronger than the other two links.

There was also a significant effect of type of responsibility information inferred, $F(2, 520) = 42.54$, $p < .0001$. A follow-up complex contrast revealed that, in support of the third hypothesis, participants tended to infer more obligation and control information than they did clarity information, $t(546) = 9.14$, $p < .001$. However, a two-way interaction also emerged between type of responsibility information inferred and strength of link presented, $F(2, 520) = 20.57$, $p < .0001$. When presented with a strong link, participants inferred an equal amount of all three types of responsibility information ($Ms = 5.7$, 5.7, and 5.6 for obligation, control, and clarity, respectively--all three $ts < 1$, all three $ps > .30$). However, when presented with a weak link or no link, participants inferred more obligation and control information

Table 15. Means for Type of Responsibility Information Inferred Analysis

	Dependent Variable		
	Obligation	Control	Clarity
Strong Link			
Obligation	5.9	5.8	5.1
Control	5.5	5.8	5.4
Clarity	5.7	5.7	6.3
Weak Link			
Obligation	3.8	5.5	4.3
Control	5.5	4.1	4.0
Clarity	5.0	4.1	2.2
Offset Control	5.3	5.1	4.3

(M = 4 8, SD = 1 4) than clarity information (M = 3 7 SD = 1 4), for the complex contrast, $t(152) = 9\ 72$ $p < .001$ Thus the third hypothesis was conditionally supported

There was also a three-way interaction between type of responsibility information inferred, type of responsibility information presented, and strength of link, $F(4, 520) = 35\ 31$, $p < .0001$ This interaction reinforces a consistent finding described in each of the three previous dependent variables. That is, the previous strength of link by type of responsibility information interactions resulted from the fact that these manipulations tended to affect the relevant dependent variables more than the other two dependent variables particularly when a weak link was presented For example consider the manipulation of obligation. As can be discerned from Table 15 this manipulation polarized perceptions of obligation more than it did perceptions of control or clarity Thus, it was indeed important to examine each type of responsibility information as a separate dependent variable

When entered as a median split, there were no effects of PWE, either alone, $F(1, 260) = .93$, $p > .30$, or in combination with other variables, all Fs < 2.11, all ps > .11 However, when entered as a continuous variable there was indeed a main effect of PWE, $F(1, 260) = 7\ 85$, $p < .006$ such that high PWEs tended to infer more responsibility information than low PWEs This finding provides a conceptual replication of Furnham's (1987) finding that the PWE is associated with the valuing of responsibility by demonstrating that high PWEs tend to infer that people are responsible in even the most ambiguous of situations However, PWE still did not

interact with type of responsibility information. Thus, no support was found for the fifth hypothesis.

Summary of Analyses on Responsibility Links

With respect to the Triangle Model of Responsibility, support was obtained for the hypothesis that participants would tend to infer more identity relevant information (i.e., obligation and control) than identity-irrelevant information (i.e., clarity). I found it particularly difficult to keep participants from inferring obligation information. Even when presented with weak control or weak clarity information, participants still perceived the central character to have an obligation to perform well in the situation. However, a repeated measures analysis comparing inferred obligation to inferred control revealed no difference between these two types of responsibility information. Furthermore, when presented with weak obligation information, participants perceived that the central character had control over the situation. Thus, it appears that if explicitly told that one of the identity-relevant piece of information is not present, people will simply infer that the other one is present.

With respect to the PWE, support was found for the hypothesis that the PWE would be directly associated with inferring obligation and control, but not clarity, about a central character. However, no support was obtained for the hypothesis that high PWEs would tend to infer more obligation and control than they would clarity.

Other Dependent Variables

I will now present results for the four other dependent variables: estimates of the central character's success, the central character's perceived psychological

engagement with the task the amount of positive affect the central character should experience for a quality performance, and the amount negative affect the central character should experience for a poor performance. The means for each of these four dependent variables appear in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19, respectively

Estimates of Success

For estimates of the central character's success, there was a main effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 177.11$, $p < .0001$. As hypothesized, participants who read about a strong responsibility link tended to predict that the central character would be more successful than did participants who read about a weak responsibility link. This main effect was qualified by a link strength by type of responsibility information interaction, $F(2, 260) = 3.52$, $p < .04$. Specifically, there were no differences among participants in the strong obligation, strong control, or strong clarity conditions, $F(2, 118) = 1.24$, $p < .30$. Thus, participants predicted more success for strong than weak links regardless of the type of responsibility information presented to them. However, among participants in the three weak link conditions, participants in the weak obligation condition estimated the central character would be more successful than participants in the other two weak link conditions combined, for the complex contrast, $t(116) = 2.69$, $p < .05$. It will be recalled that participants in the weak obligation condition also perceived the central character as having as much control as did participants in the strong obligation condition. Likewise, participants in the weak obligation condition believed that there was slightly more clarity in the situation than did participants in the weak control condition (though this latter finding

Table 16 Perceived Likelihood of Success as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs	5 4
	Low PWEs	5 0
	Overall	5 3

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	6.2	6 1	6.3	6 2
Low PWE	5 6	5 8	5 9	5 8
Overall	5 9	5 9	6 1	6 0
Weak Link				
High PWE	4.8	4 1	4 4	4 4
Low PWE	4 5	4 4	3 8	4 2
Overall	4 6	4 2	4 1	4 3

[a] Scores ranged from 1 (lowest likelihood of success) to 7 (highest likelihood of success)

was not significant) It is perhaps the case that participants in the weak obligation condition perceived the greater control and slightly greater clarity to compensate for the lack of obligation with which they were presented, thus enabling the central character to perform more successfully in the situation. Similarly, it would seem that a lack obligation would be less detrimental to an actor's chances of success in a situation than would a lack of clarity or a lack of control If a person knows the procedures to be followed in a situation (i e. there is strong clarity) and s/he has the ability to follow them (i o , there is strong control) then s/he may still be successful at the task even if s/he does not feel obligated to do so

In support of the sixth hypothesis, there was a main effect of PWE, $F(1, 260) = 4.21$, $p < .05$, such that high PWEs estimated the character would be more successful than low PWEs High PWEs, with their internal loci of control (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), perhaps believe that people will be successful because they will work hard to bring about a such an outcome This may explain why previous research (e g., Furnham, 1982, 1985, Heaven, 1990) has found that high PWEs tend to believe that unemployment is the result of characteristics of the unemployed themselves. If high PWEs expect success to be the result of hard work, then they should think that people who are not successful (i.e., unemployed, on welfare) are so because of some personal flaw

Psychological Engagement

The correlations between the three items (level of commitment, determination, and responsibility) that comprised this measure ranged from .24 to .70, all $ps < .0001$

The Croobach's alpha for this measure was .74. In his research with the Triangle Model, Britt (1999) found that commitment and responsibility correlated .74. Thus, it appears that in addition to Schlenker's (1997) contention that these items tap into one underlying construct, it is permissable statistically to combine these three items. Appendix H contains separate ANOVAs run on each of the three items comprising the measure of psychological engagement.

Three effects emerged on perceptions of psychological engagement. First was a main effect of link strength, $F(1, 260) = 90.21$, $p < .0001$. Characters were perceived to be more engaged with the task when a link was strong than when it was weak, thus supporting the first hypothesis. This main effect was again qualified by an interaction of strength of link with type of responsibility information, $F(2, 260) = 7.70$, $p < .0006$. Specifically, participants in the weak obligation condition perceived the character to be less psychologically engaged in the task than did participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions (for the complex contrast, $F(1,11) = 4.97$, $p < .01$). There were no differences between participants in any of the strong responsibility conditions, $F(2, 118) = .77$, $p > .45$. Because psychological engagement in a task is an internal state, it follows that when presented with information that an actor lacks an obligation to do well on a task, something also internal to the actor, s/he should also lack engagement with that task. However, when the rules in a situation are unclear or the actor apparently does not know if s/he can follow the rules successfully, then

Table 17 Perceived Psychological Engagement as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs	16 3
	Low PWEs	16 6
	Overall	16 4

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	18 1	18 4	17 0	17 8
Low PWE	17 3	17 0	17 4	17 2
Overall	17 8	17 7	17.2	17 6
Weak Link				
High PWE	12 9	16 0	14 9	14 8
Low PWE	13 1	15 5	15 0	14 4
Overall	13 0	15 8	15 0	14 6

[a] Scores ranged from 3 (lowest level of psychological engagement) to 21 (highest level of psychological engagement)

engagement will not be as diminished as when obligation is lacking After all in such situations, the rules can be learned, and if the central character is motivated to do so, s/he can learn how to follow those rules successfully

When PWE was analyzed via a median split, there were no effects of this variable, either alone or in combination with the other independent variables in this analysis. When PWE was entered into the ANOVA as a continuous variable, there was a main effect of the variable, $F(1, 260) = 6.43$, $p < .02$ with high PWEs tending to perceive the central character as more psychologically engaged in the task than low PWEs, thus supporting the sixth hypothesis If it can be assumed that work is a central component of the high PWE's existance, as Cherrington (1980) claimed, then such individuals may themselves experience greater psychological engagement on tasks they undertake Given that we tend to think more people share our beliefs and attitudes than is really the case (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), high PWEs may assume that others share their degree of engagement with their undertakings

Positive Affect for a Quality Performance

The correlation between the two items (credit and pride for a quality performance) that comprised this measure was .57, $p < .0001$ The Cronbach's alpha for this measure was .82

Two effects emerged on the variable of how much positive affect the central character should experience after a quality performance in the situation First was a main effect of link strength, $F(1, 260) = 11.04$, $p < .001$ Participants thought the

Table 18 Positive Affect Experienced as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs.	11.7
	Low PWEs	12 6
	Overall	12.1

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	12 2	10 7	10 4	11.2
Low PWE	12 3	11 1	11 4	11 6
Overall	12.2	10 9	10 8	11 3
Weak Link				
High PWE	10 3	13 0	13.2	12.3
Low PWE	11 0	12 5	13 1	12 2
Overall	10 7	12 8	13 1	12 2

[a] Scores ranged from 2 (lowest amount of positive affect) to 14 (highest amount of positive affect)

character should experience more positive affect when behaving under conditions of a weak link than under conditions of a strong link. This supports the second hypothesis

This main effect was qualified by a link strength by type of responsibility information interaction, $F(2, 260) = 22.81$, $p < .0001$. When a character was faced with either weak control or weak clarity, participants believed s/he would experience more positive affect for a quality performance than did participants in the two similar strong link conditions. For the complex contrast, $t(152) = 3.39$, $p < .01$. However, when a character was faced with a weak obligation, participants believed s/he would experience less positive affect for a quality performance than did participants who read about a character with a strong obligation, $t(78) = 3.97$, $p < .01$. Thus, it appears that when one performs well in a situation in which s/he is obligated to do so, s/he should experience some positive emotions, but when that person has control over the situation, or there exist clear rules to follow in the situation, such is not the case. Thus, these data seem to indicate that when external factors facilitate an actor's performance, that person should not feel as positively toward him- or herself as when s/he performs well in the face of being expected to fulfill one's obligation.

This interpretation is consistent with the discounting principle of attribution (Kelley, 1967). As mentioned previously, perceivers will discount any one cause of a person's behavior when multiple causes are feasible. In the case of strong control or strong clarity, a quality performance could be attributed to these factors (i.e., it could be discounted), not to the individual making the quality performance. That people are expected to experience more positive affect for a quality performance when their

obligation is strong than when it is weak is also understandable If one fulfills his or her obligation, a primarily internal state, then s/he ought to perceive the quality performance as the result of this internal state and thus should feel positively Finally this interaction also further supports the notion that control and clarity are perceived as more similar to each other than either is to obligation

The offset control condition participants tended to believe that people should feel positive affect for a quality performance. These participants were similar to the high obligation, weak control, and weak clarity participants in this perception, $t(155) = 1.61$, $p > .05$ However, the offset control condition participants were more likely to think the character should experience positive affect for a quality performance than were participants in the weak obligation, strong control, or strong clarity conditions, $t(155) = 3.69$, $p < .01$ Thus, unless given explicit information that clear rules exist in a situation, that a central character lacks obligation, or that the character has control over the situation, none of which is often readily apparent in everyday social observations, perceivers tend to assume people will feel positively about themselves for performing well Given the tendency for perceivers to assume that a character has an obligation to perform well, it follows that they should also assume positive affect for that quality performance that s/he is obligated to execute

There was a marginal main effect of PWE on this measure, $F(1, 260) = 3.39$, $p < .07$, such that high PWEs believed the central character should experience less positive affect for a quality performance than did low PWEs If, as postulated previously, high PWEs simply expect success to result from hard work, then this

expectation may detract from the positve feelings associated with the success If a success is unexpected then if it does occur, it is in essence a "pleasant surprise," which can enhance the person s affect.

Negative Affect for a Poor Performance

The correlation between the two items (blame and disappointment for a poor performance) that comprised this measure was .46, $p < .0001$ The Cronbach's alpha for this measure was .74

This last dependent variable, also revealed two effects. Once again, there was a main effect of link strength, $F(1, 260) = 50.50$, $p < .0001$ such that participants in the strong link condition believed the character should experience more negative affect than did participants in the weak link condition. Unlike with the positive affect for a quality performance, however there was no interaction between this variable and type of responsibility information Simply, if a person has a strong obligation to perform, control over the situation, or clear rules exist in the situation, then that individual ought to experience more inner disharmony for performing poorly than if that person has a weak obligation to perform, lacks control over the situation, or the rules in the situation are ambiguous.

There was also a main effect of PWE $F(1, 260) = 7.55$, $p < .007$ such that, as predicted high PWEs tended to believe the central character should experience more negative affect for a poor performance than did low PWEs. High PWEs are perhaps more affected emotionally by a possible failure than are low PWEs When failure is

Table 19 Negative Affect Experienced as a Function of Link Presented, Strength of Link, and the Protestant Work Ethic[a]

Offset Control	High PWEs.	10 3
	Low PWEs	9 5
	Overall	9 9

	Type of Responsibility Information			
	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Strong Link				
High PWE	10 4	10 7	10 9	10 6
Low PWE	10 5	9 6	9 6	9 9
Overall	10 4	10 1	10 3	10.3
Weak Link				
High PWE	9 1	8 4	8.2	8 6
Low PWE	9.0	7 6	7 1	7 9
Overall	9 0	8 0	7 6	8 2

[a] Scores ranged from 2 (lowest amount of negative affect) to 14 (highest amount of negative affect)

encountered one should feel badly because of it As speculated, perhaps high PWEs simply expect quality task performances, and when a quality performance does not occur, it should lead to negative affect. This idea is supported by the finding that the PWE is positively associated with predictions of task success Should such an expectation not be met, certainly one would feel disappointment, and in the case of high PWEs, they seem to indicate that a sizable portion of that disappointment should be directed at the actor himself It must realized that this is a measure of another person's negative affect for his or her poor performance; it is not a measure of how much negative affect high PWEs would feel should they themselves perform poorly

Participants in the offset control condition believed the central character should experience as much negative affect for a poor performance as did participants in any of three strong link conditions, $t(159) = 1\ 09$, $p > .20$ However, the offset control condition participants, compared with those in the three weak link conditions tended to think the central character should experience more negative affect for a poor performance, $t(151) = 4\ 14$, $p < .01$ This indicates that perceivers tend to assume the presence of one or more strong responsibility links

Ancillary Analyses

In addition to these analyses that were of primary interest, I ran several other analyses involving the PWE to better understand this personality construct These results are now presented

Correlations Between Dependent Variables

Table 20 displays the zero-order correlations between each of the seven dependent variables, as well as the PWE. At least a few results are worth noting. First, among the three types of responsibility information only two of the three correlations were significant. The correlation between obligation and control was not significant, $r(273) = .08$, $p < .18$. Obligation assesses an actor's duty to perform a task, whereas control assesses an actor's ability to execute the task. Given that one's ability to perform a task depends in part on the complexity of the task, it is not a concept that resides completely within the actor. Thus, it is not surprising that participants perceived them as distinct constructs. Both of these links were correlated with clarity, both $rs > .29$, both $ps < .001$.

Another interesting set of correlations concerns participant's judgment of the central character's likelihood for success. All three pieces of responsibility information were positively related to this judgment. It might be noteworthy to consider the types of tasks in which the central characters were engaging. Both Donna (the job applicant) and Patrick (the college student) were involved in tasks that might be considered "short-term" tasks, in that neither character could easily adjust his or her behavior should s/he encounter difficulties in performing the task. And in fact, there were no differences between the two scenarios on the dependent variable of success estimations. It may be the case, however, that on a "long-term" task, in which

Table 20 Correlations Between PWE and Dependent Variables

Measure	1	2	3	4
1 PWE	---			
2 Obligation	12	----		
3 Control	13	08	----	
4 Clarity	10	.29	42	----
5 Prediction of Success	13	.34	45	.53
6 Psychological Engagement	15	57	35	43
7 Positive Affect for a Quality Performance	04	14	07	.25
8 Negative Affect for a Poor Performance	.20	22	44	42

(table continues)

Table 20--continued

Measure	6	7	8
1 PWE			
2 Obligation			
3 Control			
4 Clarity			
5 Prediction of Success			
6 Psychological Engagement	—		
7 Positive Affect for a Quality Performance	17	—	
8 Negative Affect for a Poor Performance	36	−13	—

Note. All rs > 11 significant at p < 05, all rs > 15 significant at p < 01, all rs > 16 significant at p < 001

an actor can adjust his or her behavior to benefit from experience perceivers will display an even stronger tendency to associate each piece of responsibility information with estimations of an actor's success than found here

It is also noteworthy that while obligation and clarity were both related to positive affect, obligation was positively related to it, whereas clarity was negatively related to it As discussed previously, these results suggest that when one fulfills an obligation to perform admirably in a situation, s/he should feel good about oneself for doing so However, when one is in a situation with clear rules and procedures, then there is less reason to feel good about oneself for a quality performance because, perhaps, such a performance can be attributed to the clarity of the situation, not to something internal to the actor

With respect to the PWE, as mentioned previously, both obligation and control were correlated positively with this measure, but clarity was uncorrelated with it. Among the remaining four dependent measures three were correlated positively with this measure with estimates of success, $r(273) = .13$, $p < .03$, with psychological engagement, $r(273) = .15$, $p < .02$, and with negative affect for a poor performance, $r(273) = .20$, $p < .001$ This pattern of correlations suggests that high PWEs perceive others as engaged in their tasks. Perhaps because of this engagement, these people are expected to be successful at their tasks and should this expectation not be met, then they ought to feel poorly about themselves.

Analysis of Exploratory Measures

I next analyzed the exploratory measures. First, the alphas for each measure, the intercorrelations between these measures, and their associations to the PWE, are presented in Table 21. With the exception of the PWE scale, none of these measures had an alpha that reached the generally accepted 0.70 level.

There were two measures significantly related to PWE. Specifically, there was a positive, albeit small, correlation between PWE and the belief that human beings are rational creatures, $r(273) = .12$, $p < .05$. This finding may in part explain why high PWEs tend to make the social attributions that they do--that is, they believe humans are inherently rational, and as such, can work their way out of situations such as being unemployed. This does raise a potential paradox, though. If in fact the PWE is positively associated with the belief that humans are rational (an internal characteristic), and assuming that unemployment is an aversive state, then high PWEs, in essence, believe that unemployed individuals are making a choice to experience an aversive state, something that would seem irrational to do. However, the assumption that unemployment is aversive may not be correct. First, some people who are unemployed are so because they are trying to find a desirable job instead of taking just any employment that may be available (termed "transitional unemployment," McConnell, 1987). Unfortunately, existant research on the PWE and attributions for unemployment has only examined attributions for what is termed "structural unemployment," (McConnell, 1987) which are those individuals who lack

Table 21 Zero-Order Correlations Between PWE and the Exploratory Measures

Measure	Alpha	1	2	3
1 Protestant Work Ethic	(0 72)	-----		
2 Materialism	(0 61)	-0 02	-----	
3 Aspirations for Financial Succes	(0 56)	0.12	0 60***	-----
4 Aspirations for Affiliation with Others	(0 56)	0 02	0 06	0.25***
5 Aspirations for Community Feelings	(0.56)	0 20**	-0 06	0 21***
6 Aspirations for Self-Understanding	(0.57)	0.09	0 06	0 41***
7 Belief that People are Trustworthy	(0 57)	-0 05	-0 09	-0 16**
8 Belief that People are Altruistic	(0 54)	-0 10	-0 03	-0 05
9 Belief that People are Independent	(0 57)	-0 04	-0 11	-0 05
10 Belief that People are Rational	(0.55)	0 12*	-0 08	0 00

(table continues)

Table 21--continued

Measure	4	5	6	7
1 Protestant Work Ethic				
2 Materialism				
3 Aspirations for Financial Succes				
4 Aspirations for Affiliation with Others	------			
5 Aspirations for Community Feelings	0.35***	----		
6 Aspirations for Self-Understanding	0 44***	0 39***	------	
7 Belief that People are Trustworthy	-0 02	0 00	-0 08	------
8 Belief that People are Altruistic	0 14*	0 06	0 05	0 63***
9 Belief that People are Independent	0 01	-0 03	0 03	0 53***
10 Belief that People are Rational	0 10	0 18**	0 14*	0 38***

(table continues)

Table 21--continued

Measure	8	9	10
1 Protestant Work Ethic			
2 Materialism			
3 Aspirations for Financial Succes			
4 Aspirations for Affiliatioo with Others			
5 Aspirations for Community Feelings			
6 Aspirations for Self-Understanding			
7 Belief that People are Trustworthy			
8 Belief that People are Altruistic	------		
9 Belief that People are Independent	0 51***	-- --	
10 Belief that People are Rational	0 36***	0.29***	

* p < 05 ** p < 01 *** p < 001

the ability to hold a job for an extended period of time. Likewise, even being a member of the structurally unemployed may be seen by some as preferrable to working. It is possible that some individuals would prefer to receive welfare or beg from others than to work a job. For both these former and latter individuals, being unemployed may well be a rational decision.

The second significant correlation with PWE was an association with aspirations for community feelings, $r(273) = .20$, $p < .002$. The items comprising the measure of community feelings, which appear in Appendix F, do not seem as though they should be associated with the PWE. One possible explanation is that the PWE reflects traditional American values, one of which is achieving a sense of community with other people. By helping to improve the lives of those who cannot help themselves (akin to what Berkowitz, 1972, calls "the social responsibility norm"), high PWEs are adhering to what may be considered a traditional value.

Furthermore, this result may raise the possibility that "work" is in fact a multidimensional concept, and as such, there are many ways one can "work." One way would be to get involved in one's community. Given that the items comprising the community feeling measure do not constitute what may be typically considered work, it may also be worthwhile to examine the possibility that such an aspiration among high PWEs is motivated not by a desire to work, but rather by a desire to enhance and/or verify their self-images. That helping behavior may be motivated by such concerns is not novel (e.g., Cialdini, Eisenberg, Shell, & McCreath, 1987; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998), however, if indeed high PWE's aspirations for

community feelings are motivated by self-image concerns, then this again raises an interesting paradox with previous research. Heaven (1990) found that high PWEs recommended more "heavy-handed" solutions toward alleviating unemployment, such as eliminating welfare than did low PWEs. It could be argued that such recommendations are not helpful to the unemployed, particularly in the short-term (although conservative commentators may well disagree). Why would it be, then, that high PWEs aspire to be involved in their communities more than do low PWEs? Perhaps it is the case that high PWEs believe that individuals, being the rational creatures that they are, should be able to help themselves, but that the communities in which the individuals live can only thrive if those individuals become involved in them. Perhaps high PWEs are much like President Woodrow Wilson, whom historian Alistair Cooke characterized as a man who "Loved humanity, but hated the individual." It must be remembered that this result was not an actual measure of helping behavior per se, but rather a measure of the desire to help. These measures are not necessarily synonymous (e.g., Hofling, Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966). The association between PWE and helping behavior is one that may indeed benefit from future research.

Interestingly, the belief that people are altruistic was marginally related to PWE, $r(273) = .10$, $p < .09$. Thus, although high PWEs may tend to aspire to be more helpful at the community level, they apparently doubt that others themselves are helpful. Being helpful at the community level, however, does not necessarily mean that one is altruistic. A person's community involvement can have benefits not only

for the community as a whole, but also for that individual For instance, the person may feel positively about him- or herself for getting involved with the community Likewise, the person may meet others involved in the community, and these new acquaintances may be the reason the person stays involved with the community In examining Appendix G which contains the items that comprise the altruism subscale of Wrightsman s (1964) instrument, it does seem as though they tap into helping at the individual level, not at the community level Furthermore, they assess respondent's perceptions of helping other individuals for purely altruistic reasons; they do not seem to assess respondent's perceptions of the likelihood of helping for other reasons (e.g., self-image concerns) In addition, Wrightsman's measure examines perceptions of other people's helping behavior, whereas the desire to achieve community feelings examines one's own aspiration to help

One other correlation with PWE was marginally significant PWE was positively related to aspirations for financial success, $r(273) = .12$, $p = .05$ This raises another question about the PWE construct, that is, is it one that values work for the sake of work per se or is it one that values work for what work can provide (i.e., money)? In Weber's (1958) writings about the construct, he very much attempted to provide a justification for the accumulation of wealth. Thus, it should not be surprising that high PWEs aspire for financial success However it should be noted that financial wealth, in itself, is not particularly useful Rather it is what that financial wealth can provide that is useful Thus, it is interesting that PWE was unrelated to the measure of materialism $r(273) = -.02$, $p > .75$, which assesses the

extent to which material possessions play a role in an individual's life. This second finding is particularly intriguing given that financial aspirations were strongly related to materialism, $r(273) = .60$, $p < .001$.

I next performed a simultaneous multiple regression analysis on PWE scores using the nine other measures in Table 21 as predictors. Results of this analysis mirrored the zero-order correlations almost perfectly. Both community feeling aspirations, $t(264) = 2.50$, $\beta = .17$, $p < .02$, and the belief that human beings are rational, $t(264) = 2.19$, $\beta = .15$, $p < .03$, were significant predictors of PWE scores. Likewise, financial success aspirations, $t(264) = 1.72$, $\beta = .15$, $p < .09$, and the belief that human beings are altruistic, $t(264) = -1.94$, $\beta = .16$, $p < .06$, were the only marginal predictors of PWE scores.

These analyses indicate that the PWE is indeed related to broad views on human nature. Previous research (e.g., Heaven, 1990; MacDonald, 1972) has tended to examine the PWE in relation to attitudes toward specific types of people, almost always those people who are poor or unemployed. The current data suggest this research may only be addressing only one way in which the PWE is related to the interpersonal domain (that is, via economic phenomena). Future research on the PWE may benefit from examining how the PWE is important in a variety of interpersonal realms, such as its relationship to different love styles (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986; Sternberg, 1988) and attachment styles (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). In addition, it might be interesting to learn how the PWE is related to an individual's perceptions of other people's motivation for engaging in certain behaviors. For instance, there are

competing theories explaining why people help each other (e.g., Batson, 1991 Cialdini, 1991 Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) Perhaps high PWEs perceive others' helping behavior more as an attempt at personal gain rather than true altruism, whereas low PWEs do not hold such a perception

PWE Factor Structure

In the literature on PWE, only a few studies (Furnham, 1990a, Heaven 1989 McHoskey, 1994, Mudrack, 1997, Tang, 1993) have explored the possibility that PWE is a multidimensional construct Indeed, Weber (1958) himself conceived of the work ethic as a multidimensional construct, however, most research on PWE has tended to use composite scores on the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale Given the paucity of factor analyses on this scale, and "that factor analysis ought to be applied routinely to new personality scales immediately after they are constructed" (Briggs & Cheek, 1988 p 111), I explored the potential multidimensional nature of the PWE in this study

The 19 items of the PWE scale were subjected to a principle components analysis, orthogonal varimax rotation Application of the standard error scree method (Zoski & Jurs, 1996) indicated that a four factor solution was appropriate Previous research exploring the multidimensional nature of the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale has also found a four-factor solution to best fit this scale. Thus, I was able to compare relatively easily my analysis with that of previous research.

The results of this analysis appear in Table 22. On the whole, my four factors are quite similar to those found in previous research Specifically, my first factor

Table 22 Principle Components Analysis (Orthogonal Varimax Rotation) for the PWE Scale

Item #	Positive Outcomes of Hard Work	Dangers of not Working Hard	Anti-Leisure	Asceticism
5	0.49	0 14	0 30	0 12
7	0 49	0.29	-0 15	0 18
10	0 49	0 12	-0 39	0 03
12	0 50	0 06	0.11	0 10
13	0.41	0 11	0 14	-0.08
16	0.59	0 00	-0 04	0.01
17	0.70	-0 01	-0 14	0 14
2	-0 01	0.44	0.37	0.39
3	-0 09	0.51	-0 06	0 23
6	0 18	0.72	0 08	-0 04
11	0 30	0.64	-0 08	-0 10
9	-0 02	0.25	0.71	0 00
15	0 08	-0 26	0.70	-0 07
1	0 02	0.25	0 00	0.69
4	0 29	0 30	0 13	-0.41

(table continues)

Table 22—continued

Item #	Positive Outcomes of Hard Work	Dangers of not Working Hard	Anti-Leisure	Asceticism
8	0 37	0 01	-0 15	0 55
14	0 08	0 01	0 24	0 50
18	0 38	0 13	0 31	0 05
19	0 28	0 35	0 16	0 16
Eigenvalue	3.29	1 76	1 41	1 26
% Variance Explained	17.32	9 28	7 44	6 63

Note. Decimal figures are factor loadings after rotation which indicate the degree to which a statement is associated with the dimension as a whole Underlined statements are those which load at least 0 40 on a factor and were those used to define the factor conceptually All statements except "I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do" and "A distaste for work usually reflects a weakness of character" loaded at least 0 40 on a factor

contains seven items that espouse the positive outcomes of hard work (e g., "If one works hard enough s/he is likely to make a good life for him- or herself"). This factor is much like Mudrack's (1997) and McHoskey's (1994) hard work factor

The second factor contains four items that warn of the dangers associated with a lack of hard work (e.g., "Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time") This factor contains items from a combination of two of Mudrack s (1997) factors--dangers of unprofitable amusements (items 2 and 3) and dangers of an absence of hard work (items 6 and 11)

The third factor contains two items that question the desirability of increases in leisure time (items 9 and 15). Unlike the second factor, it does not warn of the dangers of leisure time per se, but its items are simple statements about whether or not people should have more leisure in their lives. This factor, which is identical to that of Mudrack (1997) and McHoskey (1994), is labeled anti-leisure

The last factor contains four items that emphasize asceticism in life (e g., "I often feel I would be more successful if I sacrificed certain pleasures") While three of the four items comprising this factor clearly tap into asceticism, the final item is a curiosity Item #4 "There are few satisfactions equal to the realization that one has done his/her best at a job" loaded -0 41 on this factor Perhaps it is the case that by disagreeing with this item participants indicated that they believe there are other satisfactions in life that are rewarding (such as, among other possibilities getting paid a lot of money for one's work) Is so, then this item perhaps should load negatively with the other three items Overall, this factor is similar to McHoskey's (1994)

asceticism factor, although his asceticism factor did not contain the fourth item, and did contain four other items in addition to my other three items Specifically, two items (items #5 and #12) from my positive outcomes of hard work factor, and one item (item #3) from my dangers of not working hard factor loaded on his asceticism factor

In summary, it does appear that in general the Mirels and Garrett (1971) PWE scale is multidimensional While the precise contents of the items that comprise each dimension make differ slightly from study to study, it does appear that this scale contains four relatively stable dimensions.

Assuming that the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale is multidimensional, it is perhaps misleading simply to sum participants' responses to these items and derive a single PWE score The multidimensional nature of this scale may account for why I found few effects of PWE in my primary analyses Thus after inspecting the scale's factor structure, I re-ran the 3 (link presented obligation, control or clarity) x 2 (strength of link strong or weak) x 2 (PWE score high or low) x 3 (responsibility information inferred obligation, control, and clarity) ANOVA, substituting each factor in place of composite PWE score. As before, participants were classified as high or low on a factor based on a median split of scores In re-running this analysis, however, it did not add anything of conceptual interest, so I will not discuss it any further

Differences Between Scenarios

To test for difference between the two scenarios, I ran a 3 (link presented) x 2 (strength of link) x 2 (PWE score) x 2 (scenario read) ANOVA, with scenario read being a within-subject variable. Although there were several differences between the two scenarios, these differences were not systematic and did not qualify the results already reported. In addition, there were no between-scenario differences involving the PWE. However, I present scenario differences for the sake of completeness and possible future research considerations. At this point, it will be recalled that the Donna scenario involved her going for a job interview, and the Patrick scenario involved his taking a college history course. Given that the participants in this study were college students, they could have related perhaps more easily to Patrick than to Donna. To the extent that these participants are in college for professional development, Donna's situation may have represented to them an "ideal self" scenario for which they one day hoped to find themselves, but had yet to actually experience. Appendix I contains all means pertinent to scenario differences.

On the dependent variable of obligation, there was a main effect of scenario read, $F(1, 260) = 14.28$, $p < .0002$, such that Donna was perceived to be more obligated than Patrick, $Ms = 5.4$ and 5.1, $SDs = 1.3$ and 1.3, respectively. However, this main effect was qualified by an interaction with strength of link, such that participants in the strong link conditions perceived the characters to have equal obligation (both $M = 5.7$), but participants in both the weak link conditions and the

offset control condition perceived Donna to have greater obligation than Patrick, as 3 30 and 4 54, respectively, both ps < 01

On the control variable there was a main effect of scenario read, F(1 260) = 102 03, p < 0001 Participants perceived Patrick as having more control over his situation (M = 5 7 SD = 1 6) than Donna had over hers (M = 4 6, SD = 1 6) This main effect also interacted with type of responsibility information given F(2, 260) = 9 03, p < .0002. Participants given control information were less extreme in their differences of perceptions of control between the scenarios, t(77) = 2 23, p < 05 than were participants in the other two responsibility information conditions, t(79) = 8 09 for obligation and t(75) = 7 66 for clarity, or the offset control condition, t(39) = 5 19, all three ps < 01 However, this interaction reflects the control manipulation, only when told explicitly about the character's control did participants modify their perceptions of it.

In examining the clarity variable, there was a two-way interaction between scenario read and strength of link F(1 259) = 6.71 p < 02 Participants in the strong link conditions found Patrick s rules to be as clear (M = 5 7, SD = 1 8) as Donna s rules (M – 5 4, SD = 1 6) t(120) = 1 82, p > 10 The same finding emerged for participants in the offset control condition, for Patrick, M = 4 4, SD = 1 6, for Donna, M = 4.2, SD = 1 7, t(39) = 89 p > 20 However participants in the weak link conditions found Donna s rules to be clearer (M = 3 7, SD = 1 8) than they did Patrick's rules (M – 3 3, SD = 1 7), t(112) = 2.54, p < 05 There was also a three-way interaction between these two variables and type of responsibility information, F(2,

259) = 3 59, p < 03 This three-way interaction is in part the result of the clarity manipulation Participants were more extreme in the perceptions of clarity when given clarity information than when given obligation, control, or no responsibility information. In addition, participants in the strong obligation condition perceived no differences in clarity between Donna's and Patrick's rules (M = 5 0 and 5 1 respectively). However, participants in the weak obligation condition perceived Donna's rules as much clearer (M = 4 7, SD = 1 5) than Patrick's rules (M = 3 8, SD = 1 7), t(37) = 3 24, p < 05 Participants in the strong control condition rated Patrick's rules as clearer (M = 5 7 SD = 1 1) than Donna's rules (M = 5 0, SD = 1 7) t(39)= 2 51 , p< 05 However, participants in the weak control condition rated Donna's rules as slightly clearer (M = 4 3, SD = 1 3) than Patrick's rules (M = 3 8, SD = 1 7), t(37) = 1 88, p < 12 Thus, it appears that participants were more extreme in their perceptions of Patrick's clarity than of Donna's clarity

While there were no scenario differences in estimations of success there were two effects on psychological engagement First was again a main effect of scenario read, F(1 260) = 15 25, p < 0001, such that participants perceived Donna to be more engaged with her task (M = 16 6, SD = 3 9) than Patrick was with his task (M = 15 7, SD = 3 3) This main effect was qualified by a three-way interaction between scenario read, type of responsibility information, and strength of link, F(2, 260) = 7 58, p < 0006 Participants in the two obligation, two control, and the strong clarity conditions perceived Donna as more engaged (M = 16 8, SD = 3 4) than Patrick (M = 14 9, SD = 3 1), t(119) = 3 52, p < 01 Furthermore, participants in the weak obligation condition

perceived Patrick to be less engaged than did participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions for the complex contrast, $t(111) = 3.77$, $p < .01$. Such a difference was less pronounced in perceptions of Donna's psychological engagement, $t(111) = 2.11$, $p < .05$.

While there were no differences between scenarios on perceptions of positive affect for a quality performance, there were two such effects on negative affect for a poor performance. First was a main effect of scenario read, $F(1, 260) = 31.56$, $p < .0001$, such that Patrick should experience more negative affect ($M = 9.9$, $SD = 2.8$) than Donna ($M = 8.9$, $SD = 2.8$) for a poor performance. As with perceptions of obligation and clarity, there was a scenario read by strength of link interaction, $F(1, 260) = 6.49$. Participants in the strong link conditions believed Patrick should experience more negative affect ($M = 11.0$, $SD = 2.2$) than should Donna ($M = 9.6$, $SD = 2.9$), $t(120) = 3.65$, $p < .01$. Such a belief was less pronounced among participants in the offset control condition, $t(39) = 1.88$, $p < .10$, and was nonexistent among participants in the weak link conditions $t(112) = 1.17$, $p > .20$.

Any interpretation of these between scenario differences is speculative. However, there are at least two possible reasons for these differences. One possibility is that the situations in which I portrayed the central characters were viewed by participants as vastly different types of situations. My college-age sample should be better able to relate to Patrick (the college student) than to Donna (the job interviewee). Thus, it is plausible that many participants may not have perceived as much obligation in taking a class (a mundane task to them) as in going on an

interview (a novel, hoped-for occurance to them). Likewise, one reason why participants judged Patrick to be more in control of his situation than Donna was of hers, to take another example, is that participants probably knew better how to do well in a class than how to do well on an interview. Of course, one might argue that males are generally perceived as more in control of the environment than are females, and this particular result is a function of such a perception.

As just implied, the second possibility for the scenario differences is that the sex of the central character was manipulated. Thus, perhaps this was a consideration in participant's perceptions of responsibility. However, it is unclear why participants would tend to find Donna more obligated, yet less in control than Patrick. I do not believe that either scenario was biased against one sex or the other; indeed, one aim in devising the scenarios was to make them somewhat vague. Furthermore, sex bias in the evaluation of stimulus persons is a complex phenomenon, with many studies demonstrating conflicting results (Top, 1991).

Summary of Study 2

The purpose of this study was to learn what type(s) of responsibility information are inferred by high PWEs, and how such inferences compare to those of low PWEs. Unlike in the first study, in which I made available to participants questions tapping into each of the three links of the Triangle Model, in this study participants were supplied with only one piece of responsibility information, or no responsibility information. Thus, as is often the case in social interaction, participants in this study had to make inferences based on only a small amount of information

As hypothesized, participants perceived the central character as more likely to be successful and more psychologically engaged with the task when responsibility was high (i.e., a strong link was present) than when it was low (i.e., a weak link was present). When perceiving how much positive affect the central character would experience for a quality performance, participants felt the character should experience more positive affect when succeeding in the face of weak control, weak clarity, or strong obligation than when doing so aided by strong control or strong clarity, or when not obligated to do well. When perceiving how much negative affect the central character would experience for a poor performance, only a main effect of link strength emerged: the character was perceived as experiencing more negative affect when a failure occurred despite the presence of strong obligation, strong control, or strong clarity.

Using both analysis of variance and zero-order correlations, partial support was found for the hypothesis that high PWEs would infer that the central character had a greater obligation to perform well and to control the situation than would low PWEs. However, no support was found for the hypothesis that high PWEs would infer that the central character's obligation and control were stronger than the goal clarity in the situation. Thus, while high PWEs did tend to see more overall responsibility in a situation than did low PWEs, as was expected from Furnham's (1987) research, I could not find a preference among high PWEs to infer obligation or control information relative to clarity information. However, high PWEs, relative to low PWEs, did tend to estimate the central character to be more successful, to be

more psychologically engaged with the task and to experience more negative affect in the wake of a poor performance

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

There were two primary purposes of this research (1) to test predictions from Schlenker et al 's (1994) Triangle Model of Responsibility in situations where not all information is given, and (2) to learn how the Protestant Work Ethic (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) is associated with judgments of responsibility and related factors.

In the first study, each participant was assigned to a condition in which a central character was focusing on doing well (i.e., making the Dean's List), or to a condition in which a central character was focusing on avoiding failure (i e., avoiding academic probation) Participants were then presented with 21 questions tapping into each of the three links (obligation, control, and clarity) that comprise Schlenker et al 's (1994) Triangle Model of Responsibility In an attempt to assess student responsibility either for doing well or for avoiding failure, participants first ranked the questions in the order in which they wanted them answered. Then, they considered how value each question was in isolation from the others by rating how valuable it would be to have answered

With respect to the Triangle Model in the first study, I expected participants to rank higher and rate as more valuable questions tapping into obligation and control relative to questions tapping into clarity However, this expectation received only conditional support. It was found specifically in the ranking data that when evaluating

a character who was striving for success, perceivers indeed preferred to have obligation information at their disposal. When evaluating a character who was trying to avoid failure, however, perceivers preferred to have clarity information available to them. As speculated, perhaps when observing someone striving to do well, observers would like to have as much specific identity relevant information available as possible so that should the actor succeed, then observers will learn the personal characteristics needed to succeed in that situation. Even though, as demonstrated in the second study, obligation information tends to be inferred by perceivers, they may still prefer answers to such questions to learn as much as possible about the character who is trying to do well. Likewise, given that people tended to infer obligation information compared with clarity information in the second study, participants may have asked for this latter information when evaluating someone trying to avoid failure because clarity information does not appear to be a part of the social inferencing process when evaluating another person's responsibility. While these data suggest that it may be inappropriate to ask for answers to questions that insinuate a person might fail at a task (i.e., negatively worded questions), it certainly does not seem inappropriate to ask for information about situational clarity. Thus, in a failure-oriented situation, asking for clarity information may provide otherwise unknown information without violating social norms. It should be noted that this interaction was not replicated when participants rated each question's valuableness. Consequently, this result may only hold under conditions in which perceivers have limited access to information about an actor. It might be reasonable to assume,

however, that this condition tends to better characterize most social interactions than does a condition under which a perceiver has access to unlimited information about an actor. Thus, this first study demonstrated the potential importance of the type of evaluative situation (specifically, striving for success versus trying to avoid failure) on the importance perceivers place on responsibility information.

With respect to the PWE, I expected high PWEs to rank questions tapping into obligation and control more highly and to rate such questions as more valuable, than they would questions tapping into clarity. However, these hypotheses received no support. In fact, both the rank-order data and the valuableness data revealed no effects of PWE. Furthermore, PWE did not interact with experimental condition (striving to do well versus trying to avoid doing poorly). This may have been due to the fact that I had participants rank all 21 questions given to them. Perhaps if participants had been forced to select only those questions to which they truly wanted answers, high PWEs would have chose questions tapping into obligation and/or control and thus they might have chosen fewer total questions than low PWEs.

Finally, it was found, both in the ranking and the valuableness data, that participants tended to prefer questions worded in either a positive (striving for success) or neutral manner, as opposed to questions worded in a negative (trying to avoid failure) manner. This was especially true when evaluating a person who was striving for success, as opposed to trying to avoid failure. By randomly assigning participants to one of the two situational motivations, I implicitly gave them an hypothesis, that is, a person is either trying to do well or trying to avoid doing poorly

With this implicit hypothesis in-hand, participants set out to gather information that confirmed their hypothesis. This tendency demonstrates the robustness of the human penchant for hypothesis-confirming information.

In the second study, rather than expose participants to information about all three links of the Triangle Model, I asked them to infer such information, given only one type of link information, with the link being either strong or weak, or given no link information. With respect to the Triangle Model, I hypothesized that participants who read about a strong link situation (i.e., responsibility was high) would perceive the central character to be more psychologically engaged with the task, and would estimate the character's likelihood of success to be greater than participants who read about a weak link situation (i.e., responsibility was low). This hypothesis was supported. Also as expected, participants inferred more identity relevant information (i.e., obligation and control) than identity-irrelevant information (i.e., clarity). Schlenker et al. (1994) found that people, when given a choice, preferred to have answers to questions tapping into obligation and control rather than clarity when evaluating a central character. As Schlenker et al. noted, perceivers' backgrounds may be influential in which links receive the most attention. Given the paucity of information I provided to participants, their backgrounds would seem to have played an especially prominent role in their inferences. To borrow an example from Schlenker et al., in this country, our laws apply to all normal adults. Thus, obligation is perhaps something that we tend to assume (at least at the legal level) in our culture. Likewise, people are assumed to be responsible for their actions, and so they are

assumed to be in-control of their behavior (unless proven otherwise) However, there seems to be less basis for assuming clarity, as demonstrated in this second study

When one considers that participants in the second study tended to infer more obligation and control information than clarity information, it is interesting to recall that Schlenker et al 's (1994) participants chose to have answered and rated as more valuable questions pertaining to obligation and control as opposed to questions pertaining to clarity In addition, in my first study participants ranked questions pertaining to clarity as more important than obligation or control when assessing an actor's responsibility for avoiding a failure Perhaps the nature of the tasks performed by Schlenker et al 's participants and my participants contributed to these results First, in Schlenker et al 's study, participants knew the outcome of the task, it was a failure situation However, in both of my studies, the outcome of the task was unknown. Furthermore, in Schlenker et al 's research, the extent to which the central character was involved with the known outcome was uncertain, indeed, that was the very judgment for which their participants had to gather information. In both of my studies, though, it was clear that the central character did play a role in the future, unknown outcome Even in the second study under weak link conditions the central character still played a role in the situation as participants made inferences based on this implicit knowledge

Another interesting set of findings emerged on the dependent variable of how much positive affect the central character should experience for a quality performance It was found that more positive affect should result under conditions of

both weak control and weak rule clarity, as well as under conditions of high obligation. In the case of weak control and weak clarity, observers seem to perceive such conditions as problematic to the actor's performance, which if successful is especially laudable. In Kelley's (1967) conceptualization, perceivers believe that an actor should augment his or her positive feelings for a quality performance because it happened in spite of particular constraints. For instance, suppose a baseball player has blurred vision after being hit in the head with a pitch. Should his blurred vision be known to perceivers, he will likely be perceived as not having as much control over his ability to hit the ball as before being struck in the head. Thus, should he hit a homerun in his next at-bat, perceivers, such as the media, will likely heap even more praise than usual on him for such a quality performance. Conversely, when facilitory factors are present, then the actor has less reason to feel positively about him- or herself because perhaps it was those external factors that were primarily responsible for the quality performance, not some internal characteristic of the actor. In Kelley's (1967) conceptualization, perceivers believe the actor should discount his or her quality performance because it was the presence of a factor external to the actor that may have accounted for the quality performance. As a result, there is less reason to feel positively about the performance. To extend the previous example, suppose a baseball player is especially noted for his homerun-hitting ability. One day it becomes known that this player has been taking a performance-enhancing drug. Now, perceivers might be prone to attribute his quality performances (i.e., hitting the homeruns) to the drug, not his ability. The drug may have provided the player with

greater control to hit the homeruns, so perceivers may be apt to believe such acts are less cause for positive feelings about oneself

In contrast to control and clarity, it did not appear that obligation was perceived as an obstacle to success when it was weak. As discussed previously, even when an actor does not feel an obligation to do well on a task, s/he can still do well if the rules and clear, and within the actor's capabilities If either of these latter two elements are weak, then even if the actor does feel obligated to do well, it may still not result in a quality performance.

This notion of obligation as something that is incapable of hindering one's performance is similar to Heider's (1958) notion of oughts Heider contended that oughts are invariants "which hold in spite of many variations in incidental or momentary factors" (p 220) If a person's obligation consists of what s/he ought to do in a situation then it is not surprising that participants tended to infer obligation despite the manipulations in control and clarity (i.e , the momentary factors) Heider also contended that humans tend to prefer the invariant to the variant. If indeed obligation is an invariant, and control and clarity are variants, then this helps explain why participants in Study 2 tended to infer obligation when control or clarity were weak To further this analogy to Heider's conceptualization, Heider claimed that oughts operate like the laws of physics, which allow us to make certain assumptions about the physical world (e g., drop a glass and likely it will break) If we can assume obligation (as participants did), then we can better predict others behavior, something that is essential for smooth social interactions to occur

In the case of high obligation, a primarily internal state, observers perhaps perceive it admirable to fulfill one's duty, and thus individuals who do so ought to feel positively about themselves. This interaction raises an interesting question, that is, when one has performed well, would that person appear even more competent to others if s/he does well in the face of weak control, weak clarity, or when s/he had an obligation to perform well? Along what personal dimension (i.e., intelligent, self-disciplined, industrious) does an actor appear competent when performing well when each of these three conditions exist? Furthermore, which of these three conditions do people prefer to emphasize when they have performed successfully?

It may also be the case that when an actor experiences an obligation to perform well at a task, it is akin to placing importance on the outcome of that task. Schlenker (personal communication, June 22, 1999) has raw data that demonstrates a positive association between obligation and outcome importance. However, in these data there is no relationship between control and outcome importance, nor between clarity and outcome importance. Indeed, when the outcome of a task is important (i.e., there is high obligation), then the actor will be motivated to learn the rules should they be unclear, and understand them should s/he not already do so.

With respect to the amount of negative affect the central character should experience for a poor performance, there was no such interaction; when responsibility was high, the character was expected to feel more negatively about him- or herself than when responsibility was low. This finding also suggest an avenue for future inquiry that builds upon both the Triangle Model and the literature on excuse making.

(see Snyder & Higgins, 1988) Do perceivers react differently to an actor who makes an excuse that weakens the obligation link as opposed to one that weakens the control link, or one that weakens the clarity link? If so along what dimensions are excuse makers differentially perceived given the type of excuse (obligation, control, or clarity) they make?

With respect to the Protestant Work Ethic, support was found for the hypothesis that high PWEs would tend to infer that a central character has a greater obligation to perform well and to control the situation than low PWEs Furthermore, high PWEs also tended to estimate that the central character would be more successful than low PWEs, and high PWEs believed that the central character ought to experience more negative affect for a poor performance than did low PWEs These latter two findings seem to be related, for if success is expected, then one should feel poorly about oneself should s/he not be able to fulfill such an expectation.

As noted, several studies (e.g , Greenberg, 1978a) have demonstrated that endorsement of the PWE, as measured by the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale is a valid predictor of an individual's work behavior Likewise, other research has demonstrated that endorsement of the PWE predicts an individual's attributions toward those who are unemployed (Furnham 1982) and poor (Furnham, 1985) Furnham (1987) demonstrated endorsement of the PWE was positively associated with valuing responsibility Hence, one potential reason for such attributions is that high PWEs believe the unemployed and poor are not responsible people, thus leading to their plights. One aim of these two studies was to discern what type(s) of

responsibility information high PWEs tend to prefer (Study 1) and infer (Study 2)... thus extending the Furnham (1987) research. While this research did not allow me to draw any definitive conclusions on this matter, there were a couple of findings involving PWE that may further illuminate why the PWE is predictive of attributions toward the poor and unemployed.

First, the PWE was positively related to estimations of success on performing the task. If indeed the PWE mindset is one that expects success, then it could be argued that when one violates this expectation, it leads to a particularly harsh reaction. Indeed, Biernat et al. (1996) demonstrated that one reason humans derogate out-group members is because of the perception that out-group members violate the values of in-group members. Moreover, Biernat et al. found that when high PWEs were primed to think about PWE values (specifically, the importance of working hard) they were more derogatory toward out-group members than when they were not primed. Much of the previous research examining how PWE is related to social attributions has implicitly primed participants to think about PWE values by having them make attributions for phenomena such as unemployment, something that is easily associated with a lack of hard work, and something that could easily be construed as an "unsuccessful" outcome.

Second, there was a positive correlation between PWE and negative affect for a poor performance. If, as in the discussion of value violation, I make the assumption that being among the structurally unemployed or being poor can be considered a "poor performance," then it may also be reasonable to think that high PWEs may be

expressing this belief by making strong internal attributions for these end-states Suppose a supervisor, who values accomplishment, expects an employee to successfully execute a task. Should that task not be executed successfully, not only has the supervisor's value been violated, but her expectation for a successful performance has also not been met. Alas, there are two reasons for the supervisor to be unhappy When one receives less than s/he expects, or has less than s/he knows it is possible to have, it leads to feelings of frustration (e.g , Levi, 1986) Such feelings may well be released on the person who is perceived as causing this state of affairs In the research examining the PWE and attributions for social phenomena, high PWEs may be indicated their anger with those suffering from these problems by attributing their existent to those who suffer from them Indeed, research examining the relationship between PWE and remedies for social problems (e.g Heaven, 1990) has found that high PWEs favor solutions (such as military conscription) that, at least from the viewpoint of suffering the problems, would not be preferrable compared with other solutions (such as increasing government welfare payments)

This positive relationship between PWE and negative affect for a poor performance suggests that the PWE is a prevention orientation However, recall that high PWEs also believed that the central character was more psychologically engaged in the task, estimated that s/he would be more successful, and that s/he should experience more positive affect for a quality performance than did low PWEs, all of which suggest that the PWE is a promotion focus One potential methodology to help clarify this issue may be available. In a series of experiments, Shepperd, Findley-

Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, and Perez (1999) demonstrated that people tend to perceive financial gains differently from financial losses even when such gains and losses are for equal dollar amounts These researchers found that one moderating variable in their investigations was the participant's self-assessed financial need It may be the case that another moderating variable in this area of research is the PWE Perhaps the PWE is, in Higgins' (1997) terminology, more of a prevention orientation than a promotion orientation. If this is true, then high PWEs should perceive a loss of, for example $50 to be a more-negative occurrence than a gain of $50 is a positive occurrence. If indeed there proves to be a relationship between PWE and perceptions of gains and losses, then this will shed further light on the PWE mindset, at least as it operates in the realm of economic activity

There are many other avenues of future research that could be conducted with the Protestant Work Ethic. Throughout this forthcoming discussion, one consideration remains constant, for researchers using the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale, this and other research has reliably demonstrated that it, like the underlying construct it taps, is a multifaceted instrument Although such an analysis did not make a theoretical contribution to the current research, future research may benefit from examining the different facets of this construct in addition to a composite PWE score In hindsight, it might be interesting to learn if high PWEs attributions for unemployment and welfare are driven by one facet of the PWE Perhaps, using the current factor structure, it was those participants who scored highly on the dangers of not working hard dimension that would be particularly hostile toward the unemployed and those on welfare, but

such hostility would be less pronounced among participants scoring highly on the asceticism dimension.

With this consideration in mind one area of research already that deserves attention is one that was of secondary importance in this research, the extent to which the PWE is a promotion versus a prevention mentality Are high PWEs more interested in being successful, or are they more interested in avoiding failure? People can believe in hard work for the fruits it can bear (a promotion focus) or because of the problems associated with not working hard, such as not having enough money to live comfortably (a prevention focus) Although such an effect could not be discerned in the current research, perhaps the PWE is associated with a defensive mentality In systematically probing this question, a first step might be to assess how the PWE is associated with attributions for success in economic situations. For instance to my knowledge all existent research on how the PWE is related to social attributions has examined how it is related to social attributions for negative economic outcomes, such as examining reasons for why people are unemployed (Furnham, 1982) Would research examining reasons for successful economic outcomes, such as why people are wealthy, reveal a similar type of results? Indeed, the research area of perceptions of wealth is one that has only recently begun to receive attention (e g., Christopher & Schlenker, in press), and it would appear to be an ideal area in which to begin this line of research.

As previously mentioned, it seems that much of the research investigating the relationship between PWE and attributions has focused on attributions for economic

phenomena To gain a clearer picture of the PWE mindset, it will necessary to broaden this research to examine how the PWE is related to attributions for noneconomic phenomena. Is the PWE related to the general tendency to make internal attributions for other s behavior, or is this tendency limited to those situations that involve economic outcomes?

It is also interesting that research investigating the PWE and attributions has concentrated on attributions about other people. Research is needed that examines how the PWE is related to attributions for one's own performance It may be that the PWE is also associated with the tendency to make internal attributions for one's own performance, as well as for the performance of others Consequently, when experiencing a success, high PWEs ought to display a greater tendency to engage in the self-serving bias than low PWEs by attributing a greater proportion of the success to themselves than to external factors However when experiencing a failure, high PWEs ought to display a diminished tendency to engage in the self-serving bias relative to low PWEs by blaming themselves more than external factors for the predicament. Thus, it may be that the PWE is also related to psychological well being Specifically, high PWEs may be more susceptible to fluctuations in self-esteem that low PWEs

In my analysis of the exploratory measures, it was found that PWE was related to beliefs about human nature..specifically PWE was positively associated with the belief that people are rational creatures, and was negatively associated with the belief that people are altruistic These two relationships suggest another avenue for research

with the PWE, that is, to examine how PWE is related to perceptions of other people's motivation for engaging in certain behaviors. As mentioned previously, the negative relationship with the belief that people are altruistic suggests that high PWEs might perceive people's attempts to help others as attempts to further personal interests. Likewise, the belief that people are rational creatures may help explain why it is that high PWEs are prone to blame the unemployed and those receiving welfare for their plights.

Finally, although much research has examine how PWE is related to attributions for economic outcomes, research is scant on how PWE is related to attitudes toward specific economic phenomena. Furnham (1997) conducted a study in which he assessed the relationship between work values and economic values, such as belief in the viability of the free enterprise system and attitudes toward unions. Furnham found that the work ethic was positively correlated belief in the viability of the free enterprise system, trust in business, and feelings of economic powerlessness, and it was negatively correlated with the belief that the government is responsible for the well being of the least-well-off in society and that the government should be involved in price setting. While providing insight into this area of inquiry, Furnham used the Buchholz (1977) measure of work ethic, a measure containing only five items, and which Furnham himself found to questionable in its psychometric properties. Furthermore, to return to the multidimensional nature of the work ethic, the six items comprising this particular scale do not seem to be tapping into the same underlying construct as the Mirels and Garrett (1971) scale. For example, one item on

the Buchholz scale reads "One must avoid dependence on other persons whenever possible," and another reads " To be superior a man must stand alone " These items seem to assess independence from others, which Furnham (1990a) demonstrated in his extensive factor analysis of all existent work ethics scales is but one component of the work ethic However, as demonstrated in the present research and elsewhere (e g , McHoskey, 1994, Mudrack, 1997), there are certainly other dimensions of the work ethic, and these dimensions should be investigated for their relationships to a variety of economic phenomena, such as attitudes toward taxation (Furnham & Lewis, 1986) gambling (Furnham, 1984a), and saving (Furnham, 1985b), to name but a few

In conclusion, this research found broad support for hypotheses generated from Schlenker et al 's (1994) Triangle Model of Responsibility In addition it shed light into the types of responsibility information preferred by individuals endorsing the Protestant Work Ethic, and it helped clarify why the Protestant Work Ethic is associated with tendency to make internal attributions for social ills such as unemployment. However, the current studies are but a small step in achieving a more-complete understanding of the Protestant Work Ethic.

APPENDIX A
THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC SCALE

Please give your opinion of each of the following statements, using this scale

1 = I strongly disagree with the statement
2 = I moderately disagree with the statement
3 = I mildly disagree with the statement
4 = I have no opinion on the statement
5 = I mildly agree with the statement
6 = I moderately agree with the statement
7 = I strongly agree with the statement

_____ 1 Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements

_____ 2 Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.

_____ 3 Money acquired easily (e.g. through gambling or speculation) is usually spent unwisely

_____ 4 There are few satisfactions equal to the realization that one has done his/her best at a job

_____ 5 The most difficult courses usually turn out to be the most rewarding

_____ 6 Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy

_____ 7 The self-made person is likely to be more ethical than the person born to wealth

_____ 8 I often feel I would be more successful if I sacrificed certain pleasures.

_____ 9 People should have more leisure time to spend in relaxation.

_____ 10 Any person who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.

_____ 11 People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough

____ 12 Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer

____ 13 Hard work offers little guarantee of success.

____ 14 The credit card is a ticket to careless spending

____ 15 Life would be more meaningful if we had more leisure time

____ 16 The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who gets ahead

____ 17 If one works hard enough s/he is likely to make a good life for him- or herself

____ 18 I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do

____ 19 A distaste for work usually reflects a weakness of character

APPENDIX B
THE 21 QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS
IN STUDY 1

Obligation Questions

Should your son/daughter consider academic achievement to be a duty?

Should your son/daughter consider avoiding academic difficulties in school to be a duty?

How much of an obligation does your son/daughter have to do well academically?

How much of an obligation does your son/daughter have to avoid doing poorly academically?

Do you think that being a successful student is one of the more important obligations that your son/daughter should fulfill?

How important do you think it is for your son/daughter to devote time to school versus participate in other activities on campus?

How much do you think your son/daughter should care about his/her grades?

Control Questions

How much control do you think your son/daughter has over his/her academic accomplishments?

How much control do you think your son/daughter has over his/her avoiding academic failure?

Do you believe that your son/daughter can achieve the grades s/he wants in a class if s/he focuses on doing so?

Do you believe that your son/daughter can avoid doing poorly in school if s/he focuses on doing so?

To what extent do you believe that your son's/daughter s academic performance is the result of ability and effort?

Do you believe that factors outside of your son s/daughter's control often influence his/her academic success?

To what extent do you think professors (as opposed to your son/daughter) have control over your son's/daughter s academic performance?

Clarity Questions

Do you think that your son/daughter understands and can use the correct strategies, techniques, and methods needed to achieve academic success?

Do you think that your son/daughter understands and can use the correct strategies techniques, and methods needed to avoid academic failure?

Do you think that the ways to achieve academic success are clear to your on/daughter?

Do you think that the ways to avoid ending up on academic probation are clear to your son/daughter?

Do you believe that your son/daughter is clear about what is expected of him/her in classes?

Do you think that the goals and objectives of a college education are clear to your son/daughter?

How simple or difficult do you think it is for your son/daughter to prioritize his/her academic, social, and personal goals?

APPENDIX C
VIGNETTES USED IN STUDY 2

Condition. Offset Control

Three weeks ago Donna applied for a job in a large international company. Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her. Donna's interview is this morning.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class.

Condition: Strong Obligation

Three weeks ago, Donna applied for a job in a large international company. Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her. Donna's interview is this morning. This job is for the position of an advertising campaign manager. Donna earned her college degree in advertising and was involved in several ad campaigns with her previous employer. Given her career training, it is indeed a type of position that Donna feels obligated to obtain. It would also provide her with necessary income.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. He is a political science major and was told by an advisor that the course is highly relevant to his specific career objectives. Thus, given his career objectives, he feels obligated to master the information in this class. In addition, it satisfies a social sciences General Education requirement.

Condition Weak Obligation

Three weeks ago, Donna applied for a job in a large international company Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her Donna's interview is this morning. This job is for the position of an advertising campaign manager Donna earned her college degree in computer information systems She was involved in ad campaigns with her previous employer when such projects required the use of technology Thus, she is competent to fill the position, but given her career training it is not the type of position that Donna feels obligated to obtain. It would provide her with necessary income

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. He is an engineering major and was told by an advisor that the course is irrelevant to his career objectives Thus, given his career objectives..he does not feel obligated to master the information in this class. The advisor recommended the class because it satisfies a social sciences General Education requirement

Condition Strong Control

Three weeks ago Donna applied for a job in a large international company. Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her. Donna's interview is this morning. Donna feels in control today. Physically she feels refreshed this morning after a good night's sleep. She is ready for the big day.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. He feels as if he has things under control this semester. His course load is about average and he was able to reduce the number of hours he will work in his part-time job. He thinks he will have sufficient time to study and will have no excuses for not performing satisfactorily in all of his courses.

Condition: Weak Control

Three weeks ago, Donna applied for a job in a large international company. Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her. Donna's interview is this morning. Donna does not feel in control today. Unfortunately for her, her next-door neighbors threw a loud party last night. Consequently, she did not sleep well and can hardly keep her eyes open today.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. He feels as if things are not quite under control this semester. He has a heavy course load and had to increase the number of hours he will work in his part-time job. He has doubts about the amount of time he will have available to study and whether or not he will perform satisfactorily in all of his courses.

Condition: Strong Clarity

Three weeks ago, Donna applied for a job in a large international company. Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her. Donna's interview is this morning. The company provided her with a job description of the position for which she is applying, as well as a protocol of activities for the day of her interview. Donna knows the types of questions she will be asked and how to respond to them, and she has prepared several questions to ask of her interviewer. Thus, she feels she pretty well knows what to expect going into her interview this morning.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. The course is highly structured. The instructor gives organized lectures that present material in a clear and systematic fashion. The instructor also provides a study guide that states the course goals, gives a detailed listing of the topics and readings on which the students should concentrate while studying (including an indication of which material is most likely to appear on exams), and gives a list of sample items similar in format to those which will appear on exams.

Condition: Weak Clarity

Three weeks ago Donna applied for a job in a large international company Last week, the company phoned her and said they wanted to interview her Donna's interview is this morning. The company did not provide her with a job description of the position for which she is applying, nor a protocol of activities for the day of her interview Donna does not really know the types of questions she will be asked, or how to respond appropriately to them. She is also unsure if she should ask questions of her interviewer Thus, she does not really know what to expect going into her interview this morning.

Patrick is taking an introductory history class. The course is largely unstructured The instructor tosses out general ideas for discussion and covers relevant information when it is pertinent to a topic under discussion, but does not give organized or systematic lectures In response to students' requests for a study guide, the instructor stated that all course material is testable and students are expected to make their own judgments about what is important Also, the instructor did not give students a set of goals for the course or any sample questions that might them help prepare for exams

APPENDIX D
DEPENDENT VARIABLES IN STUDY 2

FIRST IMPRESSIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Please give your impressions of Donna. Answer each item to the best of your ability by marking an 'X' in the appropriate slot in each continuum. We realize that you may not have all of the information you desire to make perfectly accurate judgments, please simply make inferences wherever necessary.

Rate Donna on each of the following scales

1. How much obligation does Donna have to do well in the interview?

Minimal Obligation _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A Great Deal of Obligation

2. How much control does Donna have over the interview situation?

A Great Deal of Control _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Control

3. How clear to Donna are the typical interview procedures and protocol?

Very Unclear _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Clear

4. How personally committed is Donna to doing well in the interview?

Very Committed _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Not at all Committed

5 How hard will Donna try in order to do well in the interview?

Not at all Hard _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Hard

6 How successful do you think Donna should be in the interview?

Very Unsuccessful _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Successful

7 Suppose Donna does well in the interview If this were to happen, how much credit should she get for her performance?

A lot of Credit _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Credit

8 Suppose Donna does poorly in the interview If this were to happen, how much blame should she get for her performance?

Minimal Blame _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A lot of Blame

9 Suppose Donna does well in the interview If this were to happen, how much pride should she feel for her performance?

A lot of Pride _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Pride

10 Suppose Donna does poorly in the interview If this were to happen, how disappointed should she be in herself for her performance?

Minimally Disappointed _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Severely Disappointed

11 How much personal responsibility does Donna have to perform well in the interview?

A lot of Personal Responsibility _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Personal Responsibility

FIRST IMPRESSIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Please give your impressions of Patrick. Answer each item to the best of your ability by marking an 'X' in the appropriate slot in each continuum. We realize that you may not have all of the information you desire to make perfectly accurate judgments, please simply make inferences wherever necessary.

Rate Patrick on each of the following scales

1. How much obligation does Patrick have to do well in the history class?

Minimal Obligation _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A Great Deal of Obligation

2. How much control does Patrick have over his performance in the history class?

A Great Deal of Control _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Control

3. How clear is it to Patrick how to succeed in the history class?

Very Unclear _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Clear

4. How personally committed is Patrick to doing well in the history class?

Very Committed _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Not at all Committed

5. How determined should Patrick be to work hard in the history class?

Not at all Hard _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Hard

6. How successful do you think Patrick should be in the history class?

Very Unsuccessful _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Very Successful

7 Suppose Patrick does well in the history class. If this were to happen, how much credit should he get for his performance?

A lot of Credit _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Credit

8 Suppose Patrick does poorly in the history class If this were to happen, how much blame should he get for his performance?

Minimal Blame _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A lot of Blame

9 Suppose Patrick does well in the history class If this were to happen, how much pride should he feel for his performance?

A lot of Pride _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Pride

10 Suppose Patrick does poorly in the history class If this were to happen, how disappointed should he be in himself for his performance?

Minimally Disappointed _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Severely Disappointed

11 How much personal responsibility does Patrick have to perform well in the history class?

A lot of Personal Responsibility _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Minimal Personal Responsibility

APPENDIX E
MATERIALISM AS A VALUE SCALE

For each of the following statements, please indicate how much each one describes you, using the following scale

1 = Not at all descriptive of me
2 = Slightly descriptive of me
3 = Somewhat descriptive of me
4 = Very descriptive of me
5 = Extremely descriptive of me

I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.

I usually buy only the things I need

I like a lot of luxury in my life

I have all the things I really need to enjoy life

I like to own things that impress people

My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't have.

I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material objects people own as a sign of success

I enjoy spending money on things that aren't practical

I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things

The things I own aren t all that important to me

Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring material possessions.

I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things.

I don't pay much attention to the material objects other people own.

Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure

I try to keep my life simple as far as possessions are concerned

The things I own say a lot about how well I m doing in life

It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all the things I'd like

I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know

APPENDIX F
LIFE ASPIRATIONS SCALE

Please indicate how important it is to you to have each of the following outcomes, using the following scale

1 = Not at all important to me
2 = Slightly important to me
3 = Somewhat important to me
4 = Very much important to me
5 = Extremely important to me

Aspirations for Financial Success

You will have a job that pays well

You will be financially successful

You will buy things just because you want them

You will have a job with high social status.

You will be your own boss

Aspirations for Self-Acceptance

You will know and accept who you really are

At the end of your life you will look back on your life as meaningful and complete.

You will be the one in charge of your life.

You will deal effectively with problems that come up in your life

Aspirations for Community Feeling

You will donate time or money to charity

You will participate in social or political movements

You will work to make the world a better place

You will help others improve their lives

You will teach others the things that you know

You will help people in need

You will work for the betterment of society

Aspirations for Affiliation with Others

You will have a couple of good friends that you can talk to about personal things

You will have good friends that you can count on

You will have people who care about you and are supportive.

You will have children.

You will know people that you can have fun with

You will share your life with someone you love

You will be married to one person for life

APPENDIX G
PHILOSOPHIES ABOUT HUMAN NATURE

Please give your opinion of each of the following statements using this scale

1 = I strongly disagree with the statement
2 = I moderately disagree with the statement
3 = I mildly disagree with the statement
4 = I have no opinion on the statement
5 = I mildly agree with the statement
6 = I moderately agree with the statement
7 = I strongly agree with the statement

Belief that People are Trustworthy

Most students will tell the instructor when s/he has made a mistake in adding up their score, even if the instructor gave more points than they deserved.

If you give the average person a job to do and leave them to do it, they will finish it successfully

People claim they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality but few people stick to them when the chips are down

Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and sins that no one else ever hears about.

Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.

Most students do not cheat when taking an exam.

If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things to them in great detail and supervise them closely

If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will reciprocate with fairness toward you.

Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance

Most people are basically honest

People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off by lying

Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason, they re afraid of getting caught

Most people lead clean, decent lives

If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure they were not seen, they would do it

Belief that People are Altruistic

Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people

Most people will act as "Good Samaritans" if given the opportunity

It's pathetic to see an unselfish person in today's world because so many people take advantage of him or her

Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble.

It's only a rare person who would risk his or her own life and limb to help someone else

"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is a motto that most people follow

Most people with a nuclear fallout shelter would let their neighbors stay in it during a nuclear attack.

People pretend to care more about one another than they really do

People are usually out for their own good.

The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others

Most people would stop and help a person whose car is disabled.

Most people exaggerate their troubles in order to get sympathy

Most people try to apply the Golden Rule even in today s complex society

The average person is conceited

Belief that People are Independent From Others

Most people have the courage of their convictions

Most people will speak out for what they believe in

It is achievement, rather than popularity with others, that gets you ahead nowadays.

Most people will change the opinion they express as a result of an onslaught of criticism, even though they really don't change the way they feel

The average person has an accurate understanding of the reasons for his or her behavior

Nowadays people won t make a move until they find out what other people think.

The person with novel ideas is respected in our society

It's a rare person who will go against the crowd

If a student does not believe in cheating, s/he will avoid it even if s/he sees others doing it.

The important thing in being successful nowadays is not how hard you work, but how well you fit in with the crowd

The average person will rarely express his or her opinion in a group when s/he sees others disagreeing with him or her

Most people will stick to their opinions if they think they are right, even if others disagree

The typical student will cheat on a test when everybody else does, even though s/he has a set of ethical standards

Most people can make their own decisions, uninfluenced by public opinion.

Belief that People are Rational.

If a person tries hard enough, s/he will usually reach his or her goals in life

Great successes in life like great artists and inventors, are usually motivated by forces people are unaware of

Attempts to understand ourselves are usually futile

Most people have to rely on someone else to make their important decisions for them.

Most people have a good idea of what their strengths and weaknesses are

There's little one can do to alter his or her fate in life

If people try hard enough, wars can be prevented in the future

Most people vote for a political candidate on the basis of unimportant characteristics such as his or her appearance or name, rather than because of his or her stand on the issues

The average person is largely the master of his or her own fate.

Our success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of our control

Most people have an unrealistically favorable view of their own capabilities.

Most people have a lot of control over what happens to them in life

Most people have little influence over the things that happen to them

In a local or national election, most people select a candidate rationally and logically

APPENDIX H
MEANS FOR ITEMS COMPRISING THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT MEASURE

	Commitment	Determination	Responsibility
Strong Link			
High PWE			
Obligation	6.0	6 2	5 9
Control	5 9	6.2	6 3
Clarity	5 5	6 0	5 5
Low PWE			
Obligation	5 8	6 1	5 5
Control	5 6	5 6	5 8
Clarity	5 3	6 1	6 0
Weak Link			
High PWE			
Obligation	3 2	4 6	5 0
Control	4 7	5 9	5 4
Clarity	4 3	5 3	5 3

(appendix continues)

Appendix H—continued

	Commitment	Determination	Responsibility
Low PWE			
Obligation	3 5	4 7	4 9
Control	4 7	5 6	5 1
Clarity	4 7	5 4	4 9
Offset Control			
High PWE	4 6	5 8	6 0
Low PWE	5 0	5 8	5 7

I will now briefly describe the effects of each of these three components of psychological engagement. Each of these three components was analyzed in a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA just as were the other dependent measures While the results for each component basically mirrored the results on the overall measure, there were a couple of differences that I will highlight.

Commitment There was a main effect of strength of link, $F(1, 260) = 133\ 91$, $p < 0001$, with participants in the strong link condition perceiving greater commitment on the part of the central character than participants in the weak link condition. There was also a main effect of type of responsibility information presented $F(2, 260) = 7\ 81$, $p < 0005$, with participants receiving obligation information perceiving the character as less committed than participants receiving control information. However these two main effect were qualified by a two-way interaction between them $F(2\ 260) = 16\ 19$ $p < 0001$ Specifically participants in the weak obligation condition tended to perceive the character as less committed than participants in either the weak control or weak clarity conditions, both $ts(111) > 4$, both $ps < 01$ Likewise participants in the strong obligation condition tended to perceive the character as more committed than participants in the strong clarity condition, $t(75) = 2\ 65$, $p < 05$ Thus, it does appear that information about an actor's obligation is a particularly important piece of information in perceptions of personal commitment.

Determination The pattern of results on this measure were similar to that of commitment First was a main effect of strength of link $F(1, 260) = 36.56$, $p < .0001$, with participants in the strong link conditions perceiving greater determination on the part of the central character than participants in the weak link condition. Second was a main effect of type of responsibility information presented, $F(2, 260) = 4.71$, $p < .01$, with participants receiving obligation information perceiving the character as less determined than participants receiving either control, clarity, or no responsibility information. Again emerged a two-way interaction between these two variables $F(2, 260) = 9.23$, $p < .0001$, and as with the commitment measure, participants in the obligation conditions polarized their perceptions of determination relative to participants in the other experimental conditions. Specifically, participants in the weak obligation condition perceived the character as less determined than did participants in the weak control and weak clarity conditions, both $ts(111) > 4.5$, both $ps < .01$. While participants in the strong obligation condition perceived the character to be more determined than participants in either the strong control or strong clarity conditions, these differences did not reach significance, both $ts(119) < 1.7$, both $ps > .05$.

Responsibility A different pattern of results emerged for perceptions of responsibility. There was a main effect of strength of link presented, $F(1, 260) = 25.09$, $p < .0001$, and as in the previous two measures, participants in the strong link conditions perceived greater responsibility on the part of the central character than participants in the weak link condition. However, there was no effect of type of responsibility information presented, either alone or in combination with the other variables. Furthermore, also unlike the previous two measures, there was a main effect of PWE, $F(1, 260) = 12.22$, $p < .0006$, with high PWEs perceiving greater responsibility on the part of the central character than low PWEs. Thus, it appears that whereas information about an actor's obligation in a situation is influential in perceptions of the actor's commitment and determination in a situation, perceivers' endorsement of the PWE is an important influence on perceptions of an actor's responsibility in a situation.

Summary Each component of psychological engagement yielded results similar to those found for the measure as a whole. For each component, there was a main effect of strength of link. For commitment and determination, there was an interaction between strength of link and type of responsibility information presented such that participants presented with weak obligation information perceived the character as less committed and determined on the task than participants in the other two weak link conditions. On responsibility, this interaction did not emerge, but a main effect of PWE did emerge, with high PWEs perceiving the character as more responsible than low PWEs. Thus, while high PWEs perceived the character as more psychologically engaged with the task, this perception seems to have been driven by the item assessing the character's perceived responsibility.

APPENDIX I
MEANS FOR BETWEEN-SCENARIO DIFFERENCES

Dependent Variable: Obligation

	Strength of Link Presented			
Scenario Read	Strong	Weak	None	Overall
Donna	5 7	5 0	5 9	5 4
Patrick	5 7	4 6	4 9	5 1
Overall	5 7	4 8	5 4	5 3

Dependent Variable: Control

	Type of Responsibility Information Presented				
Scenario Read	Obligation	Control	Clarity	None	Overall
Donna	4.9	4.8	4.3	4.5	4.6
Patrick	6.3	5.2	5.6	5.8	5.7
Overall	5.6	5.0	4.9	5.1	5.2

Dependent Variable: Clarity

	Strong Link			
Scenario Read	Obligation	Control	Clarity	No Link
Donna	5.0	5.0	6.3	4.4
Patrick	5.1	5.7	6.3	4.2
Overall	5.1	5.4	6.3	4.3

	Weak Link			
Scenario Read	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Donna	4.7	4.3	2.1	4.5
Patrick	3.8	3.8	2.3	4.5
Overall	4.3	4.0	2.2	4.5

Dependent Variable: Psychological Engagement

	Strong Link			
Scenario Read	Obligation	Control	Clarity	No Link
Donna	17 8	17 6	18 4	16 9
Patrick	17 8	17 8	16 1	16 0
Overall	17 8	17 7	17 2	16 4

	Weak Link			
Scenario Read	Obligation	Control	Clarity	Overall
Donna	13 9	16 3	15 0	16 6
Patrick	12 1	15.2	14 9	15 7
Overall	13 0	15 8	15.0	16 1

Dependent Variable: Negative Affect for a Poor Performance

	Strength of Link Presented			
Scenario Read	Strong	Weak	None	Overall
Donna	9.6	8.0	9.2	8.8
Patrick	11.0	8.4	10.5	9.8
Overall	10.3	8.2	9.9	9.3

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Andrew N Christopher was born on April 27, 1970, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana He discovered his interest in psychology while taking an introductory class his freshman year only because the class met at a convenient time in his schedule. After receiving a B B A from Stetson University in DeLand, Florida, Andrew received an M B.A. from Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas While in the graduate program for social psychology at the University of Florida, Andrew performed research in the area of applied social cognition with the guidance of Dr Barry Schlenker and was actively involved in a variety of teaching-related activities. In August 1999, Andrew will begin a tenure track assistant professor position at Anderson College in Anderson, South Carolina, where he plans to teach courses not only in social psychology, but also in introductory psychology industrial/organizational psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology the history of psychology and research methods. It is his ultimate career goal that he will be able to give to his students the many gifts his teachers have given to him Time permitting, Andrew hopes to continue his research in applied social cognition by investigating, for example, questions related to the effects of wealth cues on evaluation of a target person's behavior, developmental differences in the conception of God and in motivation for involvement in religious activities and of course, the Protestant Work Ethic

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Barry R. Schlenker Chair
Professor of Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Lisa M Brown
Assistant Professor of Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Benjamin R. Karney
Assistant Professor of Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Shari Ellis
Assistant Professor of Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Michael F. Weigold
Associate Professor of Mass Communication

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Psychology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 1999

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Dean, Graduate School